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Abstract 
 
The transformation period between intrastate civil conflicts has been primarily 
examined within sporadic case studies. A lack of macro theory in the field of 
Peacebuilding has led to a predisposition towards policy-friendly academic works. 
The policy changes and studies that get suggested take advantage of hindsight and are 
often case specific. Without allowing for the variances in differing post-conflict 
situations the changes struggle to provide usable theoretical works. This field requires 
accurate comparative studies, but the dominance of micro theoretical casework has 
undermined any larger analysis. This thesis proposes a categorical framework for 
qualitative analysis of post-conflict studies and tests it within a series of conflicts in 
the Pacific region. Comparing the Bougainville independence conflict, Fijian coups 
and reoccurring violence in the Solomon Islands, the differences apparent in each case 
will demonstrate what changes occur for better or worse, reinforcing the need for 
more incorporative frameworks. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The existence of reoccurring violent civil conflict is an unfortunate reality that 
continues to defeat modern post-conflict reconstruction efforts. A field historically 
dominated by negotiation and mediation studies, a broadening interest in defining 
successful peace resolutions and securing lasting peace developed into the 
comparatively new field of Peacebuilding. This field suffers a problem of having a 
dual nature, in that studies have had a strong tendency to be either overarching 
statements on international politics or individual case studies with a high focus on that 
single conflict. This research aims to provide a means of analysing multiple cases 
with similar tools that take into account the broader conflict theories without 
compromising the value of each individual case study. 
 
This thesis proposes to create a framework for the comparative analysis of post-
conflict situations and then display its use through a study of conflicts within the 
Pacific region. The aim is to provide a new model for improved methodological 
studies in post-conflict scenarios that can be used to improve case studies as a tool for 
studying conflict causation and degree of resolution success. A significant gap in the 
peace studies literature demonstrates a reliance on specific case studies providing 
sweeping policy decisions. The peace studies field lacks bridging theories, and the 
model presented herein is a basic look at the primary components of a conflict for 
natural comparison. Through this larger view the field of peacebuilding can change 
from hindsight related policy suggestions for specific scenarios, to a predictive tool 
for long term conflict prevention. 
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1.2 Development of Peacebuilding 
 
Traditional conflict studies have focused on the agreements that end conflicts in 
progress, and how or when these agreements are formed.  Chapter Two begins the 
research by outlining existing definitions of the key principles that can be confusing 
or misleading due to the overwhelming level of literature that has used the terms. It is 
essential to describe the central terms to prevent confusion as the deeper theories are 
discussed later.  
 
The growing literature since the early 1990’s in the field of positive peace has led to 
developments forwarding concepts of prevention over cure. As a relatively new field 
of study, conflict prevention is being explored and has grown rapidly. Within this 
field, a large volume of literature has been written regarding creating conditions to 
prevent conflict from occurring in the first place rather than ending an existing one. 
Conflict prevention is regarded as highly important in reducing the incidences of 
intra-state civil conflict. As the dominant form of modern conflict has been internal 
within a state, rather than the cold war’s predilection for inter-state war, determinants 
of civil strife have been escalated to a much more important position. By determining 
those states most likely to collapse into civil strife, actions can be taken by domestic 
or external actors to correct problems and situations before they escalate into full-
blown civil conflict. 
 
Further research has determined that a significant proportion of civil conflict and 
intra-state war stems from unresolved complications from earlier conflicts. It is this 
post-conflict reconstruction that has become increasingly interdisciplinary and vital to 
understanding intractable conflicts. The aim of peacebuilding is therefore to increase 
the understanding of post-conflict situations and finding the best means of altering the 
conditions that could threaten a return to overt conflict.  
 
1.3 Conceptions of Theoretical History and Design 
 
Conflict stems from a vast array of sources, be they direct causes such as resource 
control, or more esoteric implications such as political disposition and systemic 
imbalance. There has been a wealth of research into conflict causes, and many are 
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explored as a means of distinguishing the key similarities between theories to be used 
as key indicators for the peacebuilding model designed within this thesis. Concepts 
like relative deprivation, human needs theory and even the frustration-aggression 
hypotheses are widely used and provide a strong basis for analysis. These are 
explored at length in Chapter Three, as the general conflict theories are discussed in 
regards to conflict in several aspects such as resolution and prevention. This chapter 
also emphasises the problems in theory development and the missing components of 
current conflict theories to reinforce the rationale behind the final model. 
 
The recent surge in peacebuilding theories provides a reasonable number of concepts 
that stretch across a broad area. As a multidisciplinary field, peacebuilding naturally 
attracts wide interest from a variety of interest groups and researchers, and it is this 
broad approach that needs some narrowing down to allow systematic analysis. The 
growing development of peacebuilding literature lends support to the development of 
a wider framework, and utilising a number of these discussions while incorporating 
the conflict theories will allow a true reflection of what matters most in a post-conflict 
environment. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Design and Testing 
 
This research culminates in a theoretical model that allows comparative case study 
analysis using identical categories developed through the theories discussed earlier. 
Chapter Four extends the discussion by examining some of the most relevant theories 
in brief to emphasise the key elements of the new model. Borrowing significant ideas 
and underlying principles from other frameworks, this model is explored in full with 
extensive explanations on how it was designed and what it incorporates. Using a 
combination of temporal and categorical design techniques, the model assigns 
important conflict factors for each stage in a conflict and peacebuilding period, and 
then examines them at key points. Comparing how these differed across case studies 
reveals how each change has had an effect, and what consistencies exist between 
those cases.  
 
It is important in choosing cases to test this theory that there are some basic 
similarities between the cases. In this example, the cultural context remains stable, 
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with the chosen geographic region providing societies with closer ethnic, cultural and 
social ties. As psychological elements are exceedingly difficult to determine, the 
cultural similarities eliminate some degree of these complications. Chapter Five 
introduces a series of case studies that demonstrate the full use of the model. To test 
the model, this thesis uses cases from the Pacific region, specifically the Bougainville 
independence conflict, the 1987 and 2000 Fijian coups, and the continuing conflict 
and unrest in the Solomon Islands. These cases have enough similarities to ensure a 
successful level of comparative analysis, but differ wildly in the principle causes of 
conflict and actions taken to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence. The differences 
are principal to demonstrating how the model works, and illustrate the key elements 
of successful peacebuilding. 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
This research presents the premise that conflict can be prevented through thorough 
analysis of prior civil conflicts. While taking a very positive stance, this represents a 
growing optimism amongst peace studies researchers into the value of peacebuilding 
theory. The combination of macro and micro studies into a comparative categorical 
framework is an important step in the evolution of peacebuilding applications. While 
this model is an early progression, it indicates a notification of the gaps in the existing 
literature. The case studies used are indicative of many other civil conflicts, covering 
a variety of causes, peace efforts and party dispositions. Having examined the case 
studies in depth within the constraints of the model, the research will demonstrate the 
value of this approach and reinforce the need for an inclusive framework.  
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Chapter Two: 
 
Definitions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a common problem in any development of the social science literature that 
specific terms and descriptions are ill defined or used incorrectly. Ensuring complete 
understanding of key terms requires a detailed and thorough approach to defining 
those terms. The misconception of a key term can change the entire design or 
theoretical goal in a piece of academic writing. Accurate definitions are a necessity to 
set the boundaries on extended academic constructs, ensuring that research does not 
become lost in detail or lack a definitive end point. 
 
The field of conflict resolution and peace studies requires extremely specific 
definitions. A broadening of the peace studies field in the last decade has led to the 
development of new concepts and non-traditional uses of accepted terminology and 
theories. The emphasis of this chapter is in providing and explaining the need for 
clarity of key terms and concepts as there are special meanings inherent in conflict 
terminology beyond those definitions normally used (Burton, 1990: 2). By 
understanding these meanings the terms can be used specifically and accurately, 
providing far more useful results than could be gained with inaccurate definitions.  
 
This chapter will outline and describe several key terms that are either contentious in 
their coverage, or have several meanings. The essential term conflict needs deeper 
exploration, as the term has been used broadly in recent years. Securitisation theories 
such as Buzan’s security model (Buzan, 1998) are increasingly using wider 
definitions of conflict to gain support for alternative approaches to resolving civil 
violence. This includes a discussion on the characteristics of violence, including non-
physical factors such as identity clashes or structural inequality. The complex 
combination of these definitions as being both competition and conflict serve to 
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disrupt any clear use of the term, so the term must be clarified for use within this 
research.  
 
As the purpose of this academic work is to discuss and explore peacebuilding theory, 
this term must be discussed at length. Peacebuilding is a relatively newly formed 
concept, and while popular, it suffers from an inaccuracy as to what it precisely 
entails. Different in its temporal position and intention from both conflict resolution 
and peacekeeping, Peacebuilding provides a bridge between these disciplines. 
Describing the development and history of this term provides a basis for creating 
holistic theories in this academic area. 
 
One of the other problems in conflict definitions is deciding what a resolution or 
peacebuilding success actually is. Given the large number of peace resolutions that 
eventually fail, there are bound to be questions emerging about defining a true conflict 
agreement success. Attention can be paid to whether an agreement that ends in overt 
intra-state conflict is a success without addressing long-term considerations. Ensuring 
that a clear definition of success exists allows theorists to examine whether a 
peacebuilding situation has truly begun with the essential constituent participation. 
These terms provide the crux of peacebuilding theory, and as such, require this 
extensive chapter to explain the terms and how they are important to peacebuilding 
theory. 
 
2.2 Conflict 
 
Conflict is a central term within the conflict resolution field, and as befits a critical 
concept, it has been used in a variety of ways. This widespread use has led to a 
broadening of the term, to the point where what ‘conflict’ actually means has become 
confusing (Schmidt and Kochan, 1972: 359). The confusion in deciding the scope of 
what constitutes a conflict has led to a dissatisfactory approach to conflict resolution. 
If an analyst or academic is unable to know exactly what a conflict is, the accuracy of 
any resulting works may be wildly incorrect. Social scientists approach conflict 
resolution from their specific area of specialty, rather than a more general approach. 
As their approaches to different forms of conflict differ substantially, the use of the 
term conflict in this research must be described in full. 
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2.2a Defining Conflict 
 
One of the first areas to examine when defining conflict is the level of violence within 
a given situation to determine if peace is merely the ‘absence of war’ in which case 
conflict is only overt fighting (Fortna, 2003: 339). In simple terms, a broad approach 
could indicate that a conflict is as simple as any social disagreement, while a highly 
restrictive definition would suggest casualties must occur. These different descriptions 
have given rise to multiple conflict disciplines, with direction from psychologists, 
international relations specialists and humanitarian organisations. Each source brings 
a different focus, be it conflict as a social process or a physical manifestation. It is 
these alternative approaches that require explanation and clarification to allow the 
best conception of conflict theories. 
 
Kochan and Schmidt (1972) discussed the complication in defining conflict and 
settled on examining the difference between conflict and competition. They point out 
that a broad definition of conflict can be used to explain actions at varying levels of 
analysis, while a more specific definition is more restrictive (Kochan and Schmidt, 
1972: 361). This showed that a conflict based on striving for success could actually be 
a form of social competition, while actual violence is real conflict. The difference 
between conflict and competition is important, as it describes a level of intensity of 
the disagreement, where intensity refers to the substance of violent conflict – the 
number of dead.  
 
2.2b Conflict Intensity 
 
Researching conflicts on the basis of intensity of battlefield related deaths comes with 
several significant limitations. It may be difficult to count casualties and the 
differences in casualty scale between large and small states provide inaccuracy in 
generalisation (Rupesinghe, 1998: 26). Essentially, instead of relying on fixed 
numbers of deaths, conflict could exist in all aspects of human social life (van 
Tongeren, 2005: 11). At its most simplistic a hundred battle related deaths in a state 
with a population measured in millions will have far less impact to the nation than in a 
state with only a few thousand people, where everyone is far more likely to see the 
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effects of conflict first-hand. Therefore, to define conflict accurately, a decision on the 
level of precision must be made. To some extent this is a trade off between 
quantitative accuracy and a definition of conflict potentially more suitable to a 
peacebuilding environment.  
 
There are some necessary preconditions for a conflict to erupt and become violent. 
Obviously, there needs to be at least two opposing parties, with some form of 
relationship. The level of interdependency between these parties is important, as the 
actions of one party must have some form of impact on the other. These 
interdependent actors must also perceive the common dependencies as negative, be 
ready to resort to violence and also see violent options as the most cost-effective 
policy (Reychler, 2001a: 5). What is central to a conflict therefore, is that there are 
multiple parties and a high probability of resorting to violence.  
 
2.2c Conflict as an agent of change 
 
Despite its negative connotations, conflict is intertwined with the notion of change, 
and can be embraced as a way to create a proactive solution to an existing problem 
(van Tongeren, 2005: 11). The key to successful change is in avoiding armed and 
direct violence. It is this concept that guides peacebuilding theory to work towards an 
improved future among all the parties in a conflict. Once direct conflict has ended, a 
redirection of future hostility or violence into the less overt and dangerous forms is 
essential to create this positive future.  
 
2.2d Final Definition of Conflict 
 
A conflict could be described as a period of intense pursuit of incompatible goals by 
different groups (Reychler, 2001a: 5), but this is too broad for a study on 
peacebuilding. The simplest definition of conflict must be specific and measurable. 
Henderson defines conflict as a “sustained violent clash between opposing groups, 
which may or may not involve fatalities” (2005: 4). This maintains the concept of 
violence, be it political, cultural or direct, and suggests that there should be a series of 
events, not merely a one-off action. The above definition suits a quantitative study as 
it suggests categories of violence, duration and groups while allowing qualitative 
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analysis on a deeper scale. To ensure that a conflict is seen as serious enough to 
warrant investigation, the definition for this thesis will take the same approach but 
contain the proviso that fatalities have occurred either as a direct result of the conflict, 
or by implication thereof. It is extremely important to note that this academic work 
will not be addressing the incredible complexities of psychological conflict, as 
determining the motivations and ways people think is extremely difficult. However, 
this area is still relevant and so will be addressed indirectly through the field of 
reconciliation. 
 
2.3 Peacebuilding 
 
The traditional definitions of peace concern the absence of war. Modern concepts are 
broader and include creating situations that guarantee positive human conditions – as 
positive peace ultimately needs to be obtained by changing the very societal structures 
that are responsible for the suffering and conflict (Jeong, 2000: 23). This is very 
different from the traditional definition of peace, in which the absence of direct, overt 
violence (such as war) is sufficient. Derivatives of security theory have led to a 
growing understanding of ‘new security’ definitions where non-military issues are 
given similar weight to their military counterparts (Henderson, 2005: 4). As security 
and protection are key components of building a lasting peace, the new security 
concept provides depth to emerging peace theories. 
 
2.3a Historical Origins 
 
A modern term, peacebuilding entered the political science vernacular most notably in 
the 1992 speech, the ‘Agenda for Peace’ by former United Nations (UN) secretary 
general Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 5; Rupesinghe, 1998: 17). Born 
from the growing threat of internal conflicts and the UN’s inexperience and inability 
to tackle intra-state violent, peacebuilding has come to give voice to post-conflict 
reconstruction. The Agenda for Peace outlined a grand new vision for UN peace 
missions, by acknowledging the growing number of identity tensions and economic 
hardships within states and difficulty in ensuring peace lasts. Boutros-Ghali stated that 
the UN needed to “stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: 
rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” 
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(UN.org, 1992). New objectives began to emerge for the UN’s peacekeeping 
intentions – that preventive diplomacy needed to investigate how conflicts escalate 
and how conflict can be predicted including; 
  
- Identify any situations that could produce conflict, and the best ways to 
remove the sources.  
- Once conflict has occurred, peace efforts must resolve the deeper issues. 
- That the UN, through peacebuilding, must preserve the peace when fighting 
has stalled. 
- The UN must assist all contexts of peacebuilding, including institutional 
rebuilding and physical reconstruction (Rupesinghe, 1998: 17-18). 
 
2.3b Timing of Peacebuilding 
 
In the typical life cycle of a conflict there is a natural decline in tension after the 
violence has ended. Lund’s diagram of the Life History of a Conflict illustrates that 
peacebuilding occupies the later stages of a conflict, both simultaneous and 
contiguous with peacekeeping efforts (Lund, 1996: 38). This stage focuses on the 
failure of usual efforts to shift conflicts to a stable situation and reduce re-escalation 
probability (Lund, 1996: 41). Rather than examine the relationship between two 
different states, peacebuilding aims to reduce the need for conflict by addressing the 
problems and damage within a state. It is also important to note that peacebuilding 
focuses on reconstruction of the state and its internal functions. By reducing a need to 
resort to violence to solve differences and inequality, the desire to war on either 
neighbouring states or internally within a state should also be reduced. 
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(Figure 1: Life History of a Conflict (Lund, 1996: 38)) 
 
The traditional efforts in this stage have been mixed, often occurring through different 
agencies or organisations. Successful peacebuilding is a complex process that is truly 
interdisciplinary and covers multiple domains including direct security, economic 
development, social rehabilitation and political reform (Jeong, 2005: 27). 
Peacebuilding activities must be complementary, requiring agencies and actors to 
have some form of coherent structure or plan. This stage is not purely about physical 
reconstruction of the damaged state, and also needs to cover social reconciliation and 
healing (Assefa, 2001: 336). The many core values or referent objects that make up 
these problematic areas are often plural in nature, in that they are not specific to any 
one topic (Asberg, 1998: 170). Given the interrelated nature of these problems, a 
successful analysis requires a measurable study of these factors and their relationships 
within a broader set of categories. 
 
2.3c Peacebuilding as a Synergetic Process 
 
The sheer complexity of state security stabilisation and rebuilding requires a high 
level of coherency. In practice, peacebuilding is a synergy of social and economic 
development through multiple organisations. Its aim is to transform conflicts in a 
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constructive way to create an environment conducive to sustainable peace (Reychler, 
2001a: 12). Peacebuilding isn’t just about solving a single situation or managing a 
conflict – rather it is concerned with changing the way parties interact and ultimately 
solving the deeper problems at the core of the conflicts. 
 
2.4 Success 
 
Success is a highly relevant term in the field of conflict, as the degree of success in 
the preceding peace agreement provides significant indicators to the likelihood of 
peace lasting. A key problem in determining peacebuilding motivations is to gauge 
what success really means, especially when discussing peace agreements. Judging 
success in a conflict scenario is entirely relative, especially in an environment where 
there is no clear agreement on criteria and time frames, and no simple means of 
comparison with other situations (Jeong, 2005: 35). If the ceasefire and initial security 
provisions are weak and poorly accepted, constituents are increasingly likely to see 
failure as more certain, and increase the probability that they will resort to old 
behaviour. It is the acceptance of the peace process by constituents and elites that 
spurs overall change and is necessary to prevent a fragile peace agreement from 
faltering (Rothstein, 1999: 228). This acceptance occurs at different rates, and can 
impact multiple areas of civil society based on enthusiasm or depth of change. As a 
result, this modifies the wider conception of success and highlights another 
complexity of measuring success. Essentially, determining success is a form of 
evaluation of a process or outcome, and while this could be a negative approach, 
evaluation allows feedback to determine what worked and what failed in order to 
improve future efforts (Pearson d’Estree et al, 2001: 103).  
 
2.4a Points of Reference 
 
One way to gauge success is to find commonly accepted goals and fixed objectives 
within finalised peace agreements, as this serves to provide points of reference (Jeong, 
2005: 35). Those within a post-conflict society will have similar goals, such as the 
ability to maintain employment and have access to food and water. Methods of 
examining these goals are difficult, as two specific areas are clearly visible – 
quantifiable factors that can be tangibly measured with statistics, and qualitative 
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factors that lack physical substance. Tangible outcomes allow measurable progress 
and are excellent for creating theories, as they can be used to view specific variables 
or categories of the results (Jeong, 2005: 35). This is extremely useful for performing 
successful comparisons between case studies. Intangible factors can include elements 
such as social justice, depth of democracy and post-conflict reconciliation (Jeong, 
2005: 35), but these are extremely hard to measure. Examining them as qualitative 
categories allows for some level of evaluation for comparison. With this in mind, it is 
possible to measure and compare the success of post-conflict situations. 
 
2.4b Linearity and Indicators 
 
Success is a non-linear process in that there are multiple indicators that are measured 
at different rates. The indicators must be measured across a combination of categories 
to provide integrative results. Since the progress of the indicators varies, the 
importance of individual factors is weighted differently (Jeong, 2005: 36). At the 
beginning of a post-conflict phase, initial security and protection are more important 
and may reflect success, while in the long-term success may be indicated through 
political transition or economic growth. Thus, for this academic piece to state the 
success of certain actions, there are many factors to take into account across temporal 
and tangible areas. As such, a categorical framework that takes multiple time frames 
into account is reinforced. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
The conflict field has grown substantially in the last fifteen years to explore new 
possibilities in preventing intractable conflict. As the field has developed, some of the 
key terms have become widely used by scholars and practitioners from a variety of 
academic backgrounds. Peace studies has become truly multi-disciplinary, with 
involvement and development by psychologists, political scientists, military 
academics and biological scientists, to name but a few. If security is about survival, 
then these non-military concerns are extremely relevant, in determining how a state 
should handle indirect security threats (Buzan, 1998: 21). By defining the issues of 
conflict and violence more accurately, study can begin the transition into a more 
Page 22 
analytical and procedural approach to determining the likelihood of a conflict re-
igniting. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
General Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The field of political science has grown in scope and breadth since it’s inception, and 
in modern publications theorists have made numerous attempts to describe how, why 
and when conflict occurs. A number of these theories are directly relevant to 
peacebuilding theory while others are more important in the development of or 
significance to the general scope of conflict studies. As the literature has expanded, a 
growth of cross-discipline research has allowed new creative approaches, borrowing 
and lending techniques from statistics, science, mediation studies and numerous other 
fields. Reconciling these techniques requires an in-depth study of the existing 
literature in some of the key fields, examining central topics and concepts that 
contribute to the broader understanding of conflict prevention.  
 
Some of the causes of conflict must be examined to outline the general characteristics 
of why conflicts begin. Despite the difficulty in examining this subjective question, 
some larger interests can be observed, providing a series of categories for study and 
use within broader frameworks. Studying the factors that create or exacerbate conflict 
allows a researcher to understand rationales for individual decisions to resort to 
violence.  
 
The essential core of this research orientates around the concept of peacebuilding. 
There has been a growing body of literature on the subject, developing the field since 
it’s political inception in the 1990’s. Interest in this area has increased, as there has 
been an acknowledgement of the dominance of intra-state over inter-state conflict in 
recent years, and the long-term repercussions of civil conflict. By describing some of 
the more popular theories the general properties of peacebuilding literature can be 
outlined and used to assist construction of a more general peacebuilding framework.  
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There exists a persistent problem within social science of consistency in case studies 
between differing authors. Without some form of cohesion between studies there is a 
far greater difficulty in deriving positive results amongst multiple studies. Some 
common ground between studies is essential to develop accurate extrapolation 
towards broader theories. This has led to a split amongst Peacebuilding writers, in 
which some focus on the individual case studies (a micro level) while others examine 
the system level effects (macro level). Bridging this gap requires a cohesive approach 
to case studies whereby commonalities across the broader spectrums are more 
effectively highlighted.  
 
Finally, there are a vast number of theories in the conflict resolution field, crossing 
disciplines between concepts of human behaviour, securitisation and mediation. 
While these don’t specifically deal with peacebuilding theory, the contributions are 
still valid. They can assist with constructing frameworks and hypotheses using 
indirectly related techniques and ideas. These contributions are essential for 
developing new approaches to this field.  
 
3.2 Causes of Conflict 
 
The question of precisely what creates conflict is difficult to answer decisively. There 
are a huge variety of potential causes, and mapping these for practical analysis 
requires extensive examination of the existing literature. This study refers to the 
expression ‘causes of conflict’ to mean those general factors or concepts that are 
known to be important or critical to the onset of various conflicts. By providing a 
finite list, analysis can break down causes of conflicts into broader categories that 
allow a more cohesive and comparative use of case studies. Understanding these 
causes also furthers study towards determining how consequences of past conflicts 
and unresolved causes create the underlying problems that disrupt attempts to resolve 
internal conflicts (Abdallah, 2001: 157).   
 
There are some commonly accepted underlying causes of discontent and conflict 
within a state, but the list of what contributes to these causes is incomplete. These 
could include government legitimacy, internal inequality, social discrimination, the 
status of the rule of law, depth of poverty, and any number of other economic, social 
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or political indicators (Sriram and Nielsen, 2004: 2). It is extremely difficult to 
complete this list, as different factors are weighed differently, and each of these 
factors could be comprised of several differing evidential statistics, with different 
authors disagreeing on the importance of each factor (Sriram and Nielsen, 2004: 170). 
Causes of conflict should be more broadly categorised to ensure a better 
understanding of the subject matter. While these categories can be isolated and 
studied independently, it is crucial to understand that conflict resolution theory must 
take into account the dynamic quality of interactions across the entire conflict 
environment (Tidwell, 1998: 72-73). It is the transformation process of finding 
commonalities between parties to emphasis an all-encompassing peace process that is 
vital to successful conflict resolution. 
 
3.2a Structural Causes of Conflict 
 
Structural causes of conflict refer to sources of violence or disagreement that cannot 
be traced to a single incident or occurrence, and rather result from circumstances 
within the very structure of the state functions and institutions themselves (Jeong, 
2000: 22). State functions or organisations such as the police are extremely important, 
as their weaknesses may indicate an inability to negotiate problems. Perceptions of 
inequality within state functions can easily lead to conflict based on bias and unequal 
access to state benefits. The entire structure of the apparatus of state can be orientated 
around servicing specific institutional interests, and combined with insufficient 
knowledge of the negative impacts, can increase the potential for structural violence 
(Burton, 1997: 33). These restrictions on resolving social conflict with weak 
institutions, and a perceived bias or dominance within the state towards one identity 
group over another all lead to structural causes of conflict. Without strong structures, 
a state’s ability to resist corruption and violence is drastically reduced, increasing the 
probability that conflicts will lead to violence.  
 
3.2b Inequality in Institutions 
 
Several authors have discussed how problems within state institutions can lead to civil 
conflict. Rothstein (1999) has discussed the presence of socio-economic 
fragmentation and its contribution to enhancing conflict. An escalating gap between 
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the dominant community within a society and their opponents (or perceived 
opponents) can directly lead to an enforcing of that lopsided structure (Rothstein, 
1999: 12). If one group is dominant within a state, gaining political leadership and 
economic power, they are in a strategically better position to entrench their views and 
values, as well as support their in-group community. This can exacerbate any existing 
cleavages, with the imbalance leading to structural support within the state for this 
dominance. Once conceived, the opportunities for outsiders to change this structure 
diminish, enhancing prospects for future conflict as the perception of bias grows. This 
is a form of protracted conflict based on a conflict of intangible assets and communal 
‘belonging’ that leads to deeper feelings of contempt and opposition against the 
dominant faction (Rothstein, 1999: 17). Therefore, the institutions of state that direct 
authority for state functions are exceedingly important to study as a means of 
determining institutional support for inequality. 
 
Perceived inequality or bias of one societal group over another is a form of cultural 
conflict, whereby the perception of differences in ideology and identity create barriers 
of discrimination against those of another group (Jeong, 2000: 23). Concepts such as 
religion, nationalism, and ethnicity can be condoned and reinforced by cultural norms 
within a society. While this may not indicate the beliefs of the entire society, the 
latent violence is extremely difficult to isolate and recognise (Jeong, 2000: 23). In this 
way, the very structure of a society’s internal cleavages can generate increased 
potential for violence. 
 
3.2c Opportunities of the Individual 
 
Individual’s need opportunities to strive, survive and succeed in society, and when 
deprived of these, can lash out against a perceived opponent. This relates to how 
individuals interpret the processes and structure of the systems around them. This can 
be drastically different between individuals given contrasting cultures, languages, and 
traditions, reinforced by evolutionary and historical forces (Tidwell, 1998: 91). John 
Burton suggested that the way individuals think is driven by repetition of previous 
events, and explains the desires for individual success (Tidwell, 1998: 91). He 
surmised a shorthand theory for ways of describing structural violence through a set 
of Basic Human Needs (Burton, 1997: 35). Burton’s human needs theory discards the 
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concept that conflict is based on coercion and power and instead suggests that humans 
desire a basic set of requirements for the continuation and propagation of life as akin 
to animals, but also have needs relating to ‘survival of the self’ (Sites, 1990: 9-10; 
Tidwell, 1998: 78). More than simply stating that humans need food and water, which 
is common to many animals, Burton suggests that humans have specific universal 
needs that are not culturally unique (Clark, 1990: 38). Basic needs theories reject the 
underlying assumption that violence exists in the unconscious psychology of humans, 
suggesting that it instead originates within factual, measurable objective criteria 
(Jeong, 2000: 70). The fact that there may be common, essential human needs 
provides some problems for conflict theorists, but also suggests commonalities to ease 
the difficulties faced by peacebuilding actors. These needs include problems of 
physical security, intellectual stimulation, identity recognition, and effectively some 
form of control over their life. Thus, in order to prevent conflict, needs theory 
emphasises the necessity of satisfying human needs by fulfilling their needs in a 
harmonious society (Roy, 1990: 125).  
 
Part of the Burtonian argument suggests that people will not accept institutional 
arrangements that deny the satisfaction of their basic human needs. The only way to 
prevent societal conflict is to satisfy, or provide the perception of satisfaction, of these 
needs (Tidwell, 1998: 80). This theory can be criticised as a method of reducing 
conflict since there is substantial difficulty in defining how one defends identity or 
roles. 
 
A similar concept based within the opportunities of the individual is Dollard’s 
frustration-aggression hypothesis that is based on the principle that when someone is 
blocked from their pursuit of a goal, there is a natural increase of frustration (Dollard 
et al, 1944: 1; Jeong, 2000: 67). This hypothesis indicates that humans naturally 
become aggravated when prevented from gaining their desires. The consequent 
natural build-up of frustration needs to be released and can do so in a destructive 
manner. If the aggression cannot be targeted against the actual source (or the 
perceived source) of the frustration a displacement of hostilities may occur against 
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substituted objects1 (Jeong, 2000: 67).  Essentially as Berkowitz described, 
“frustrations produce an instigation to aggression” when individuals are prevented 
from achieving their full potential (Berkowitz, 1978: 691). The anticipation of an 
expected goal, and the hindrance in attaining it caused by the very structure of society 
means there is a potential for backlash. This potential for aggression discussed by 
Dollard and Berkowitz indicates one technique in which societal inequalities and 
opportunity deprivation can lead to conflict.   
 
Contributing to the build up of frustration are the combined effects of rising 
expectations and the lack of societal or individual progress towards a perceived better 
life. This relative deprivation is best defined as an actors perception of the 
discrepancy between what the actors value, and the capability they have to achieve 
this (Jeong, 2000:69). If the gap of what they believe they are rightfully entitled to 
and their actual condition grows too extreme, the intolerable result can provide a 
precondition for future unrest. This is somewhat subjective, as it involves the 
perception of deprivation rather than a manifest reality. Different levels of society 
have varying senses of welfare or status entitlement (Jeong, 2000: 69). The 
dissatisfied perception of their situation, rather than some form of tangible measure 
can produce instability. Essentially, the collective sense of entitlement can increase 
faster than the capability to fulfil the desire, so that in general the expected ability of a 
state to satisfy basic needs rises disproportionately to what the state is actually able to 
provide. 
 
3.3 Peacebuilding Literature 
 
Peacebuilding is a relatively new field of study, with plenty of emerging literature 
strengthening and developing existing theories. The depth of literature and 
involvement of research beyond traditional political studies has helped to develop this 
truly multidisciplinary field. It is an increased focus on studying the roots of violent 
conflict rather than simply dealing with overt war that has become central to this 
growth.  
 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘redirection’ used by animal behaviourists is a similar concept, indicating a degree of 
crossover study potential with the biological sciences. 
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3.3a Democratisation and Liberal Economic Competition 
 
Reychler has suggested that use of state power is vital in determining the potential for 
peacebuilding success, as the democratisation process is inherently peacebuilding 
through confidence building measures (Reychler, 2001a: 216-217). By introducing 
the concept of the Democratic Peace Theory to the discussion on peacebuilding, 
Reychler directly links that existing (although controversial) theory with 
peacebuilding, as a means of attributing long-term stability to a democratic transition 
process. On a similar note, Abdallah recognises the need for this democratic transition 
period and the essential need to devise specific solutions to deep-rooted problems 
such as ‘political intolerance, freedom of press, funding of political campaigns and 
power sharing’ (Abdallah, 2001: 162). The implication that structural changes impact 
heavily on post-conflict societies has created several additional studies, becoming a 
core component of post-conflict reconstruction theories.  
 
Many of the existing peacebuilding theories suggest states should maintain certain 
political regimes or economic systems, but make these suggestions under the 
assumption that the state can function at all (Paris, 2004: 46). Despite this modern 
assumption, classic liberal thinkers such as John Locke ascribed a human need for 
common government, so that there was some starting point for driving prosperity 
amongst a community (Paris, 2004: 47). Authors like Roland Paris have expressed the 
need for research to take this into account, and rather than simply regarding one 
government archetype as superior to another, research should analyse the needs of a 
community before determining a superior structure. Furthermore, Paris posits that the 
widespread opinion that democracy and capitalism are the best means of rebuilding a 
state is fundamentally flawed, in that both systems thrive on competition, and a post-
conflict environment where reconciliation and economic growth are recent 
developments is hardly ideal (Paris, 2004: 156). The entire process of democratisation 
itself can be fundamentally flawed if executed incorrectly and even those conducted 
in ‘free and fair’ manners can create further conflict while only providing the 
appearance of peacebuilding success (ibid: 164, 218). An uncomfortable fact, this 
underlines the value of new literature and perspectives on the central assumptions of 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
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3.3b Structural Transformation 
 
Rothstein has highlighted that peacebuilding is ignoring the introduction of a ‘peace 
structure’ (a structure that builds peace) and associated processes for carrying it out 
(Rothstein, 1999: 18). The argument of Basic Human Needs suggests that institutional 
changes are absolutely inevitable (Jeong, 2000: 27) when dealing with the root causes 
of violent conflict, as they often stem from structural inequalities. Combining a short-
term approach to creating long-term peace is problematic in that mingling the causes 
of conflict (such as short and long term factors or those of tangible and intangible 
issues) can lead to a perception of weakness or inaction, as parties involved can often 
ignore the larger ‘mosaic’ and how each factor or approach can help address the 
situation (Rothstein, 1999: 20). Jeong goes further, outlining the importance of an 
‘implementation time frame’ to provide guidelines for levels of peacebuilding 
programmes (Jeong, 2005: 29). Every action within a post-conflict effort must be 
understood in terms of its temporal requirements, be they dependent on other actions, 
or able to run synchronised with others. The long term approaches aim to change the 
root causes of conflict and influence parties perceptions, while short term approaches 
are effective at responding to the emergency needs of communities to increase short-
term survival (Jeong, 2005: 29-30). However, all too often these goals become 
confused, inappropriate time frames are selected, and truly multidisciplinary 
approaches are rendered weaker or ineffective. Jeong and Rothstein have both 
demonstrated the importance of conceiving appropriate time frames and acting within 
the optimism of potential opportunity rather than waste the euphoria following a 
peace agreement.  
 
3.3c Reconciliation 
 
One of the oft-discussed problems in settling timetables for peace is the inherent 
difficulty in determining how long reconciliation must go on for to achieve a 
transformation of partnerships. Reconciliation is essentially a process whereby parties 
are able to come to terms with past adversaries, repair fractured society and recover 
from the psychological damage of violent conflict (Jeong, 2000: 192). Ensuring social 
reconciliation takes place creates an environment where disagreements can be dealt 
with peacefully. As Paris states “War-shattered states tend to be particularly lacking 
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in cultural constraints on violent behavior that might otherwise help to contain 
democratic and capitalist competition within peaceful bounds” (Paris, 2004: 170). 
Some authors even suggest that after protracted violence there is no way to restore 
ethnic harmony (Kaufmann, 1996: 153). While psychological problems are incredibly 
hard to perceive and repair, there is a necessity to include and study methods of 
reconciliation, as any anxiety over physical safety can immediately prevent the 
successful long-term peace efforts that lie at the heart of peacebuilding.  
 
3.3d Traditional Critiques of Peacebuilding 
 
It is easy to critique peacebuilding theory, mainly due to its roots in Positive Peace 
theory. Traditional Realist arguments would posit that peacebuilding is unrealistic and 
heavily bound by some preconceived but murky notions of what constitutes a peaceful 
or ideal society (Jeong, 2000: 26). It can be more expedient and less complex to 
simply focus on how a specific area can have an impact, such as political science, 
rather than encompass broader areas such as psychology, biology or resource 
management. There is a strong argument that a narrow focus on controlling the 
symptoms of violence has a more tangible effect (and thus is more marketable to 
those who pay for the action) than the ongoing struggle to improve the quality of life 
and inequalities of civil society in war-torn regions (Jeong, 2000: 26). With this 
viewpoint it is easier to simply look at disarmament and immediate security concerns 
rather than tackle the large problems. However, it is this limited scope that fails to 
address the real causes of conflict. It is inherently cheaper in the long term to fix the 
problems underlying the conflict rather than continually ‘fighting fires’ as they 
develop. Ultimately, the positive mechanisms in peacebuilding must be 
complementary to the realistic concerns of immediate violence prevention.  
 
3.4 Micro versus Macro Studies 
 
One of the central problems in conflict studies is determining how to use studies that 
have been performed earlier. Traditionally there are two forms of study - either 
descriptive (qualitative) or statistical (quantitative). Qualitative examinations are 
those that include compiling case studies, interviews and personal experience, while 
quantitative techniques analyse statistics through various mathematical techniques 
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including multiple regression and statistical cross-tabulation (Lin and Loftis, 2005: 5; 
Lieberman, 2005: 438). However, analysis using either of these techniques has its 
own limitations. Entirely descriptive works provide suitable background material, but 
lacks measurable, comparable results. Conversely, a statistical, theoretical study can 
focus on numerical values and categories, allowing comparative studies and 
mathematical approaches, but loses accuracy when problems of definitions and the 
complexities of scale interfere. As both traditional approaches have such significant 
and justified criticisms, a search for new forms of analysis has incorporated 
techniques from other disciplines. This thesis suggests a middle ground approach that 
utilises the wider theoretical perspectives to form a framework for analysing case 
studies with better accuracy and cohesion. 
 
3.4a Mixed-Method Analysis 
 
A modern technique often used in scientific fields has become known in social 
science as mixed-method analysis, and this serves to approach problems with fresh 
perspectives (Lin and Loftis, 2005: 4; Petter and Gallivan, 2004: 1; Caracelli and 
Greene, 1993: 195). Only becoming popular in social science recently, this 
approaches theoretical analysis based on combining the two fields of quantitative and 
qualitative research. Typically this can provide inferences about the state or period 
being studied that individual case study or mathematical approaches cannot 
(Lieberman, 2005: 440). This is primarily useful when used in general fields with 
hard numbers or categories where results are measurable, but individual situations can 
vary wildly in scope. For example, a key factor in analysing the intensity of a conflict 
may be the number of casualties within the conflict but a large state may consider a 
hundred deaths as a small number of fatalities while the effect on a small state of 
losing a dozen people may be just as devastating. It is problems of scale and 
perception such as this that makes qualitative analysis more suitable for some studies. 
Creating more general frameworks in which to examine a conflict requires finding 
similarities and trends that suits quantitative studies. By mixing these two approaches 
into the mixed-method analysis, social scientists aim to find the larger categories to 
study that allow superior comparative analysis. 
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A mixed-method analysis would begin with a wide study of international conflict. It is 
difficult to extrapolate system-relevant results from a small number of cases with 
many variables, as intense individual studies are prone to bias and other problems 
(Lieberman, 2005: 435). This broad approach does not necessarily demand a high 
level of sophistication, and prevents dominance by ideological restrictions, especially 
given the specialties of individual researchers in case studies (Lin and Loftis, 2005: 
5). Common practice by researchers is to code qualitative data with statistical analysis 
to locate outliers, and then to study these cases in depth within their respective fields, 
but true mixed-methods provide a better framework to examine these comparatively 
(Caracelli and Greene, 1993: 202).  
 
One form of mixed-method analysis is to conceive a broad set of factors common to 
similar research fields and then to extrapolate these to case studies that lack deep 
statistical information. This allows mixed-method approaches to still be relevant for 
difficult cases, and is more practical for ground-level practitioners. 
 
A useful way to approach this form of analysis is by addressing factors that are 
exhaustive rather than prescriptive – that is, using criteria that are known and 
understood rather than working to create a fresh list. A list of factors can be 
assembled from several sources such as existing literature, case studies and personal 
experience, ensuring that past research isn’t wasted (Pearson d’Estree, 2001: 105). 
Not all factors should be used, as too much data will exacerbate confusion 
(Lieberman, 2005: 435).  
 
Mixed-method analysis would appear to be a superior approach to building 
conceptual frameworks. While most research methods have some flaws that prevent 
research from being both realistic and accurate, mixed-method approaches provides 
room for cooperative research (Petter and Gallivan, 2004: 1). The use of scientific 
techniques in social science provides can enormously benefit the field if introduced 
correctly, as they expand the repertoire of available tools beyond the simple case 
study approaches that currently dominate the field of political science. Its use in the 
context of post-conflict peacebuilding provides a means to examine multiple variables 
to evaluate significance.  
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3.5 Other Approaches to Peace Studies 
 
While the focus of this thesis is on peacebuilding theory, the scope of the field is large 
enough to ensure other aspects of peace studies are considered, as well as reflecting 
on traditional political science approaches to international relations and conflict 
theories. There is a wide array of studies into several elements of social violence, 
including describing violence itself as a set of different forms of conflict. A closer 
look at these broadens the understanding of violence and its manifestations, allowing 
a focus on areas that can correct existing problems.   
 
3.5a Types of Violent Behaviour 
 
The earlier discussion regarding conflict and the difficulty in providing a firm 
definition is important to the concept of violence, and what leads individuals or 
groups to inflict violence on another. Since there are many different forms of 
violence, and what leads to the use of each sort is different, a discussion on the cost-
effectiveness of violence and its forms is directly relevant. Violence can refer to any 
situation where the life expectancy of individuals or communities is intentionally 
reduced in a manner that can be measured (Reychler, 2001a: 5). This broadens the 
concept of violence to include non-physical actions such as the loss of access to 
resources. Four aspects of violence become evident in this broader view – Physical, 
Psychological, Structural and Cultural (Reychler, 2001a: 6). Each aspect is important 
in suggesting alternative ways to correctly identify a type of violence and conclude 
the appropriate ongoing conflict.  
 
Direct (or physical) violence refers to actions where a person or group commits 
violence in a situation where the aggressor can be confronted or pinpointed 
(Rupesinghe, 1998: 28). The main intention is to force or coerce the victims towards a 
desired goal through the use of torture, killings, and other methods of outright 
physical hostility. This is the most traditional definition of violence and is the most 
relevant to the immediate conflict situation. A peace agreement should, at its very 
least, order a halt to overt violence. The urgency for ending direct violence is 
uppermost, as parties cannot even attempt economic redevelopment or social 
reconciliation when their lives are endangered. However, once the actual fighting has 
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stopped and the parties attempt to build a lasting peace, direct violence becomes less 
overt than some of the other sources of violence. 
 
While the most visible violence is armed, resulting in death or forcible coercion, 
psychological violence aims to create a situation where the targets are mentally unable 
to resist coercion (Reychler, 2001a: 6). There is a large amount of existing literature 
discussing social and psychological violence, especially when describing perceptions 
and identity dominance in unbalanced societies. Psychological violence can be seen 
when a society exists in a war zone or where suffering is commonplace. A readiness 
to accept violence or suffering as normal decreases the opportunity for peaceful 
alternatives to disagreements. This is a difficult source of violence to determine, and 
is often dismissed as being purely metaphorical or theoretical in regards to 
international events rather than try and gauge the extent of this form of violence.  
 
Structural violence is an endemic process where conflict occurs within the very 
structure of a society, creating an imbalance. This imbalance of power between people 
or groups within a society can cause substantial differences between a population’s 
quality of life and equality with other groups (Rupesinghe, 1998: 28-29). This could 
occur through uneven resource distribution, access to medical supplies, education, and 
even equality of political access. This is effectively a situation where the aggressor is 
intangible, and violence is reflected in the dominance of one group over another. 
 
Finally, cultural violence is less easily definable, as it regards identity and symbolism. 
Ethnic domination, religious symbols and ideological differences are all hallmarks of 
cultural violence that can be recognised through symbols of hate and provocation 
towards violence in the speech and attitudes of different groups (Rupesinghe, 1998: 
29). Essentially, cultural violence is the indoctrinated indirect conflict between 
identities, usually based off perceptions or ideology of discrimination. It can be 
characterised as a deliberate attempt to dominate or eliminate a way of thinking, 
acting or being (such as ethnicity or gender) through use of culturally significant icons 
or actions. 
 
These types of violence are important to the conflict field as it indicates general 
categories or sources of contention before, during and after a conflict. While there has 
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been plenty of literature on finding peace agreements during intra-state conflict, 
discussing peace and conflict prevention in a post-conflict environment requires this 
broader definition of violence. These forms of violence are essential to understanding 
the processes that peacebuilding uses to reduce the potential for future violence.  
 
3.5b Negative versus Positive Peace 
 
Traditional concepts of negative peace have focused on prevention of manifest 
violence and using mediation to resolve problems, often expressed through the term 
‘negative peace’. As a result, international stability is often kept through reciprocal 
agreements backed up by deterrence from a dominant military force. This has worked 
for inter-state conflicts, as the central state authorities are able to order a cease-fire, 
but is less applicable to intra-state conflicts where non-state actors often have more 
complex issues and relationships to the other warring parties. Galtung’s work in 
examining and defining peace for study introduced the suggestion that negative peace 
was about an absence of personal violence (Galtung, 1969: 183). By providing this 
more precise context, Galtung was able to isolate physical violence from structural 
violence, which he termed ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1969: 183). 
 
Positive peace has introduced a concept of peace that relates to the development of 
just and equitable conditions, where peace indicates the absence of structural 
violence. The simple absence of direct violence doesn’t explain how states should 
deal with untenable social orders and difficult human conditions (Jeong, 2000: 25). 
Sometimes known as sustainable peace, this has come to mean vertical social 
development, and the removal of structural violence. Equality between different 
groups within a society reduces tensions, and is a suitable goal for peacebuilding 
proponents. Eliminating social repression and tackling perceived poverty is essential 
to positive peace, and these goals touch upon a combination of issues that influence 
the quality of life (Jeong, 2000: 25). To neglect social and economic development 
inadvertently contributes to the original causes of the conflict (Jeong, 2005: 28). As 
the new notion of peace has become more widely accepted, the understanding of 
peace now incorporates this much wider set of definitions. This is important to the 
concept of peacebuilding as it provides a set of fundamental goals for post-conflict 
actors and processes. Positive peace theory has, in essence, created a whole new field 
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of peace studies that shifts the focus away from ending conflicts towards changing 
situations to prevent conflicts from ever occurring. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
There is a growing depth of literature regarding building and maintaining long-term 
structured peace. As this is a truly multi-disciplinary field, there must be some 
constraints on what elements to include within a structured and categorical analysis of 
post-conflict scenarios. By investigating the causes of conflict and the broader ways 
in which conflict materialises the large amount of literature in this area can assist in 
deciphering the forms that violence or disagreements will take. A practitioner that can 
understand and predict how conflict will occur can take action prior to the eruption of 
violence that aim to reduce the likelihood of it occurring or create techniques or 
processes to alleviate the conflict at a later point. Similarly, while peacebuilding is a 
relatively new term, there has been plenty of literature about related topics, especially 
around the problems of democratisation and competition within modern structures. 
This is vital to the conception of successful peacebuilding efforts as it ascribes certain 
problems to traditional means of recovering post-conflict states. The confusion 
between studies that originate in ‘macro’ general theories and ‘micro’ case studies has 
prevented testing concepts and extrapolating individual successes. By combining 
these with a form of mixed-method analysis to create a categorical framework that 
tests case studies against each other in pre-determined areas, the problems of scale 
and prediction are reduced. The violent nature and application of conflict discussed 
here expands the concepts of conflict within the broader boundaries of negative and 
positive peace. These wider concepts provide legitimacy to the peace studies field and 
reinforce the importance of understanding, predicting and pre-empting the outbreaks 
of civil conflict. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
Constructing a Theory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Peacebuilding and comparative peace research is a relatively new field in political 
science, and as such they have had less time to develop. There are effectively two 
approaches to peacebuilding analysis, those done by a highly theoretical approach that 
examines system level implications and individual case studies performed mainly by 
practitioners within specific conflict environments. There has been little attempt to 
combine these approaches to allow successful measurement of system level and 
domestic changes during the peacebuilding process. Essentially there is no effective 
conceptual foundation for the gaps between these literatures (Call and Cook, 2003: 
239). This chapter details the creation process of a categorical framework that 
encompasses some of the concerns of the wider theories, while deliberately setting up 
areas for direct comparison to test success amongst multiple cases, thus filling this 
gap within the existing literature. 
 
To ensure this framework is robust, the framework creation process is described in 
full, complete with rationales for decisions made and comparisons to existing 
elements from other aspects of theoretical conflict resolution. Beginning with an 
introduction into the basic concepts of similar frameworks, a description of both 
temporal and categorical approaches will demonstrate the intentions of the framework 
before the final design and its typical use is explained.  
 
4.2 Conceptual Narrative 
 
A successful peacebuilding design is difficult to fathom. Rather than a simple series 
of checkboxes to enable statistical simplicity or a massive set of potential tasks that 
require immense case studies to determine success, peacebuilding theories must be 
concerted and simple all at once (Jeong, 2005: 19). Effectively making a successful 
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peacebuilding theory requires a keen distinction between what the goals of a 
peacebuilding theory are, and the peacebuilding process itself. While some 
peacebuilding designs are heavily theoretical with a focus on the international system, 
others focus too closely on what peacebuilding actors can actually do, but experience 
problems with repeating previous failures. This problem of distinction with Macro 
and Micro studies divides progress both in theoretical and applied conflict studies 
(Schellenberg, 1996: 10). In regards to used terminology, the expression ‘Peace 
Studies’ often refers to the larger, Macro theories, while those studies of individual 
cases or low levels of involvement tend to be labelled ‘Conflict Resolution’ attempts. 
This terminology provides some distinction to how each theory can be utilised, and a 
vague guideline for an over-arching framework.  
 
Some theories are too complicated or highly theoretical with little use for the ground-
level practitioner. This is acceptable for peace study theorists, but some bridge 
between the two needs must be introduced. For example, Doyle and Sambanis 
‘Peacebuilding Triangle’ displays the relationship between the depth of hostility, 
factions involved, economic development and international assistance, and attempts to 
show through the use of statistics and mathematics the level of relations between 
those factors (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 782). 
 
(Figure 2: The Peacebuilding Triangle (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 782)) 
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While this sounds precisely like what is needed within this field, this statistically 
complex model simply shows that there is some relation – a starting point, but it is 
unable to succinctly provide an analysis between cases to highlight areas of 
opportunity or show how the cases differed. It is these statistical approaches that are 
useful for broader theories, but require some translation to case studies for practitioner 
use. This model highlights four important areas of interest: peacebuilding capacity of 
international actors, capacity of local actors, the level of hostility and their 
relationship (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 782). As each of these form their own 
categories for analysis, reinforcing the potential for categorical studies and their 
popularity among theorists. This model also fails to highlight the importance of the 
issues involved, which as Lund suggests, are the very causes of the conflict (be they 
Structural, Proximate or Immediate) and implies that by resolving the individual 
issues significant conflict relief will occur (1999: 18-19). 
 
A similar approach by Reychler shows that a conflict is made up of several elements, 
allowing analysis through controlled categories (2001a: 6-7). This approach separates 
conflict factors into multiple categories, including: 
 
• Actors 
o Who the parties are, their leaders and constituents 
• Interests and Issues 
o Competing or common interests 
• Opportunity Structure 
o Institutional means to resolve issues or unequal distribution of power 
• Strategic Thinking 
o How parties define their situation and best agreement options 
• Conflict Dynamics  
o The transformation process itself (Reychler, 2001a: 6-7) 
 
This approach puts as much emphasis on the transformation process as it does for 
more traditional areas such as the Actors and Issues. It reiterates the importance of the 
categories of Actors and the Issues, while implying there are institutional and 
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perceptual elements to a conflict. These are all valid categories for study, but given 
the similarity of Actors and their perceptions, there is automatically some scope to 
combine categories. 
 
These general concepts require a more fixed approach where each category can be 
highlighted both in relation to each other, but also in a manner more conducive for 
case studies. The notion of comparative case analysis within conflict resolution itself 
is utilised by d’Estree, Fast, Weiss and Jakobsen in their Framework for Comparative 
Case Analysis of Interactive Conflict Resolution (2001: 106). 
 
A Framework for Comparative Case Analysis 
of Interactive Conflict Resolution 
I. Changes in Representation  II. Changes in Relations 
• New Learning 
• Attitude Change 
• Integrative Framing 
• Problem-Solving 
• Better Communication and New 
Language 
 • Empathy 
• Improvements in Relational 
Climate 
• Validation and 
Reconceptualization of Identity 
• Security in Coexistence 
III. Foundations for Transfer  
IV. Foundations for Outcome / 
Implementation 
• Artifacts 
• Structures for Implementation 
• Perceptions of Possibility 
• Empowerment 
• New Leadership 
• Influential Participants 
 • Networks 
• Reforms in Political Structures 
• New Political Input and Processes 
• Increased Capacity for Jointly 
Facing Future Challenges 
 
(Figure 3: A Framework for Comparative Case Analysis of Interactive Conflict 
Resolution (d’Estree et al, 2001: 106)) 
 
This example shows a typical categorical framework that allows for substantive 
comparative analysis. Practitioners can use frameworks similar to this to prepare their 
peacebuilding actions, determine criteria to distinguish success from failure, and focus 
on which levels of analysis are appropriate for study (d’Estree et al, 2001: 111). 
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However, as with other models, the factors are merely highlighted and separated into 
broader categories for comparison without some awareness of when the efforts take 
effect. This can be somewhat alleviated by focusing on the actual changes made in 
each area, so that rather than examining the type of leadership, a study can perceive 
real change between the post-conflict scenario and the peace transition process. 
 
One approach presented by theorists such as Bercovitch is the systematic categorical 
technique that can make use of a variety of techniques (Bercovitch, 1993: 671). While 
covering mediation and its success or failure, this framework is a good example of a 
process driven theory that utilises categories across a temporal span (as seen by 
Context and Process leading to an Outcome).  
 
 
(Figure 4: A Contingency Model of Mediation (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 671)) 
 
This model identifies three stages in time: the existing context, the peace or mediation 
process, and the outcome (identified in later work as the Antecedent, Current and 
Consequent stage (Bercovitch, 2000: 173)). This reinforces the need for a model with 
temporal awareness that is dynamic in its ability to compare results. The second 
dimension of depth at each layer can be displayed as a more categorical level, 
allowing further investigation. It is the interaction between these layers that allows the 
framework to function as intended.  
 
This focus on the correct methodology is important, as it is the approach that dictates 
much of the final outcome (Labonte, 2003: 268). Correspondingly, a focus on merely 
restoring order for practitioners has its own perils, as problems such as power 
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imbalances between groups, incorrect governance or inadequate economic 
understanding may be ignored and not addressed in specific studies without 
conceiving the overarching influences (Jeong, 2005: 3). The two primary components 
to this framework must be expanded next before combining them in a similar manner 
to the concepts introduced here. 
 
4.3 Design Element One: Temporal layout 
 
As seen in several models there is some necessity for temporal awareness to 
demonstrate the progression of time and effort through a peacebuilding process. 
Rather than assume changes occur as implemented, it is easier for a categorical study 
to state the situation before and after the process, with a simple description or familiar 
title applied to the efforts involved. This allows a swift analysis of the changes made 
without becoming focused on every action taken, which is the purview of extensive 
case studies.  
 
A number of peacebuilding theories or studies have taken the assumption that 
transitions in development occur linearly, and political or economic changes act on 
the same time lines (Call and Cook, 2003: 236). Rather, each change or development 
can happen on its own independent schedule, and with the problem of interconnected 
issues, leads peacebuilding actors to a web-like structure of theoretical thought. 
Temporal relationships between activities should therefore be seen in terms of their 
mutual effects, and each time frame should take into account the level of importance 
and stage of implementation (Jeong, 2005: 29, 36). As Jeong describes it “Peace is not 
likely to be achieved in a linear time frame and with a single area focus” (2005: 36). 
This implies that one fixed time frame for the model is unlikely to get sufficient 
results, and that a broader theoretical scale is required. 
 
Consequently, this model will use three stages for its temporal layout. The first stage 
will consist of the factors as they existed at the time the conflict ended, detailing the 
history of the situation prior to any peacebuilding efforts. This creates a baseline for 
analysis and is especially useful for case study prospects as it provides descriptions of 
the main components prior to any change. The second stage will describe the 
transition process, and rather than explaining each element in its entirety, will place a 
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label or title on the action undertaken during the peacebuilding process. This allows 
simple and swift recognition of what major actions have been undertaken during the 
process and the areas that these have focused upon. The third and final stage is a 
combination of examining the new conflict or one in the making, and the end result of 
the efforts conducted in the peacebuilding transition phase. This essentially takes 
similar categories to those expressed in the first stage and illustrates any change, with 
the evidence collated from the second stage. This final stage also highlights the 
success of the efforts and is important in comparing different case studies. 
 
4.4 Design Element Two: Categorical layout 
 
Each conflict is made up of a large number of potential factors or elements, and as 
such an in-depth case study may be necessary to determine a series of categories for 
these elements to fit into. A less complex comparative study of multiple cases can be 
performed without a large degree of statistical data or official information requests 
through a broad series of categories that provide a briefer scope to attain results that 
can also cover a broader area. Further statistical studies could enhance this approach 
in the future based on the findings emerging from the comparative categories. 
 
With the huge array of factors potentially available in a full statistical study of cases 
(especially in a multi-disciplinary field), qualitative measures have an advantage in 
this conceptual framework in that they are achievable within either a small or large set 
of cases. This allows the considerations of scope to be bypassed in favour of a 
categorical system, allowing study on a small set of cases, with practical application 
to others (Bennett et al, 2007: 115-116). For example, if every state in the cases 
studied had populations between ten and twenty million, any casualties or 
implications thereof are on a similar scale, while comparing the same with a 
microstate would be far more difficult. By using a categorical, quantitative means to 
study these, the problems of scale and scope are heavily reduced. This also reduces 
some of the drawbacks of quantitative study, such as the abundance of scholarly 
information required, need for large data sets, assumptions and lack of information 
(Bennett et al, 2007: 117). 
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Creating effective categories that isolate specific factors is a difficult proposal, but 
one that has been covered by many academics. Rather than identifying these in terms 
of specific security issues such as Political, Economic, Environmental, and so on 
(Henderson, 2005: 9), the approach here is more akin to those suggested in 
Bercovitch’s model and d’Estree’s framework (described earlier in this chapter). A 
conflict isn’t merely the sum of its issues, but rather is a combination of various 
factors, and this approach divides them into various categories based on similar 
natures to allow relational research if necessary. 
 
There are five categories used for this model that both separates some traditional 
elements but also combines some together to reduce the restrictions traditional studies 
have. These categories are: 
 
• Involvement 
o Defining who the parties involved are, both external and internal. 
o How involved they are or how deep their commitment is. 
• Structural 
o Physical infrastructure and institutional strength of organisations. 
o Levels of deprivation and cultural/economic imbalances. 
• Governance 
o System and type of government, consistency of governance. 
o Strength or corruption of government and related processes. 
• Reconstruction 
o The efforts that are in place for reconstruction. 
• Resolution 
o Strength of the agreement or action that led to cessation of hostilities. 
o Issues and interests that remain unresolved. 
 
This form of study requires different types of analysis, some of which are statistical 
(for example population and casualty figures) while others are purely descriptive. 
Some forms of data require transformation from raw figures to a categorical approach, 
allowing for analysis on similar scales within different contexts (Caracelli and 
Greene, 1993: 197). 
Page 46 
 
4.4a Involvement 
 
Many studies focus on whom the parties are involved in the conflict and the external 
agencies intervening separately. This study places all the actors, agencies and their 
respective stakeholders in the category of involvement, as this allows direct and 
simplified comparison between the groups without confusing them with the other 
fields. It also allows a quick way to see the depth of commitment and participation 
from those groups alongside one another.  
 
It is important to identify the parties involved in a conflict, determining those that are 
stakeholders to each part of the conflict (Reychler, 2001a: 6). Identification of the 
primary parties and respective leaders is crucial in understanding who has good 
reason to interfere or be affected by both the conflict and the peacebuilding process. It 
is also important to identify the leaders as separate from their organisations as the 
requirements for accommodation and compromise between parties may result in 
leaders making agreements with others that their constituents find dissatisfactory 
(Rothstein, 1999: 228). Elites often find it necessary to make these agreements and 
attempt to downplay negative connotations to those who follow them.  
 
One of the conceptual gaps often missed by researchers is the difference between elite 
driven and local processes (Call and Cook, 2003: 241). Many attempts to resolve 
economic or other problems make the assumption that changes at one level will 
automatically positively affect the other. The strategies at different levels (such as 
interpersonal, group and society) should be timed correctly to prevent a bias on one 
sector of society, and this can be extrapolated into the theoretical model (Jeong, 2005: 
32). Examining the participants in the conflict and identifying their level of 
involvement both in the conflict and transition period can determine their impact on 
the situation. 
 
A second consideration is the involvement of external agencies. Many international 
organisations have been created as a result of previous efforts or ideals, and those 
agencies “that conduct peacebuilding are themselves the products…of previous 
efforts” (Paris, 2000: 42). This means that incorrect processes that are not appropriate 
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to the given situation may dominate the external actors themselves. An agency created 
during a period in which the liberal market economy is the predominant economic 
model may have bias towards certain techniques, and might be unable to adapt to 
significant variations. Deciphering the ‘real’ identity of the external agencies is 
necessary to determine how they may react or deal with certain problems. The 
external parties may also serve to act as mediators, arbitrators and peacekeeping 
forces. The mistrust between warring communities means that an external mediator or 
negotiating team is often required to prevent the conflict from escalating or erupting 
anew (Abdallah, 2005: 163). Identifying which parties are present to do so and their 
motivations and rules is extremely useful in determining whether the actions they 
have taken are effective, and what may have made them succeed. The capacity for 
success is limited by a large number of factors such as their history of success, 
strength of relevant services (be they armed, economic or otherwise) and even internal 
governance.  
 
Thus, the category of involvement includes the parties involved in the conflict directly 
and their respective goals and drives, those parties’ constituents (as the leaders 
opinions may differ from those forming the majority of the party), the external 
agencies involved and their relevant capacities (be they benevolent, ambivalent or 
hostile) and the international environment they all act within.   
 
4.4b Structural 
 
Structure is a term that refers to something that is planned and organised, be it 
physical or institutional. Structural elements are important, as they allow a study to 
define both the structure and design of institutions and their capacity for action (such 
as the police to secure civil control). Institutions are important, as it is often easiest to 
assess post-conflict damage by the condition of the states civil institutions. As a more 
tangible indication, the destruction or reduction in capacity from damage to the 
physical infrastructure is indicative of a conflicts legacy. Fighting over desired 
infrastructure, or destruction as a means to increase one party’s position over another 
often means a state has a severely reduced capacity to function post civil conflict.  
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It is also important to examine the structure of the society and the power relationships 
between parties that give opportunities for personal or communal advancement 
(Reychler, 2001a: 6). While this could be classed as part of the identification process 
of the Involvement category, the structure of their relationships within the societal 
structure is different, as these determine what actions are allowed as per the 
opportunity structure and social imbalance. This section allows those structures to be 
studied as separate from the individual parties to avoid confusion. 
 
Where a states ability to enforce its law is compromised by weak judicial institutions 
(such as the police and courts) a lack of accountability can lead to opportunities for 
conflict. With reduced repercussions for their actions, conflicting parties can resort to 
more drastic means without suffering consequences, increasing the probability for 
violence. For instance, in states where the police cannot reliably quell riots, or arrest 
those responsible for crimes, there is less incentive to adhere to those laws that 
prevent parties from achieving their objectives. Thus, the strength of the 
government’s means to uphold laws is important to understanding the decision for 
parties to resort to violence rather than rely on civil resolution techniques. 
 
Tertiary to the judicial institutions is that of sanctioned and non-sanctioned military. 
The military is a problematic issue, as the case for demilitarisation within the state is 
strong, given its common financial dominance within the budget of a state 
experiencing civil conflict (Harris, 2006: 245). Given the non-traditional security 
threats that dominate post-conflict situations, the finance directed to the military may 
be better suited to assist the reconstruction. It is also useful to analyse the extent to 
which the local and external military forces have been trained in peacebuilding or 
civil enforcement techniques, rather than peacekeeping duties, which vary in both 
deployment strategy and difficulty (Harris, 2006: 250). This can overlap with the 
involvement category to a degree if the military itself is an actor within the conflict as 
a separate entity from the state institutions. 
 
Finally, the structure of the reconstruction effort can be examined here, analysed for 
the extent that external bias or techniques specific to that case have been used. The 
very structure of reconstruction attempts are inherently derived from external sources, 
and utilising something different than the typical international model of liberal market 
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democracy is visibly deterred by external agents (Paris, 2000: 43). Whether these are 
appropriate for that case can be examined by comparison, quickly detailing the 
broader techniques utilised. This technique may show that the same or similar model 
is utilised consistently by international peacebuilding efforts and the success of that 
model should become readily apparent.  
 
4.4c Governance 
 
The strength and type of governance indicates not only the type of government, but 
also the consistency, corruption and legitimacy of the government and how it carries 
out its duties. Governance is thus attached but separate from government, and 
represents the method by which a state acts within its domestic setting. The distinction 
is important, as studying one form of government over another is less important to 
determining a successful peacebuilding effort than is the success of that government. 
Thus, this category examines the system of government, level of corruption within 
that government, the consistency of the government (how it is made up, legitimacy, 
ethnic or gender imbalances in representation and so on), support of the government 
by its citizens and the processes by which the government carries out its duties.  
 
Fundamental to post-conflict reconstruction are the efforts at nation-rebuilding. 
Where state authority and functions have completely collapsed, contested or 
ambiguous sovereignty often develops to represent the general interests of the 
conflicted society (Jeong, 2005: 83). Many organisations and facilities are built to 
accommodate the interests of the different groups within a society to increase the 
balance and equity of ethnicity and identity based representation. A functioning 
government requires the rebuilding of public institutions and must have the capacity 
to manage and sustain their use (Jeong, 2005: 83). To function, the state needs wealth 
or aid to enforce and institute these government functions. Notably, the average 
duration of a successful democratic system in a low-income state is about nine years, 
with the first few being the most important (Collier et al, 2003: 64).  
 
Frustratingly, a lot of existing literature simply discusses the argument about 
democratisation and it’s effect on peacebuilding, and fails to address the problems in 
governance and civil servant corruption that is endemic to post-conflict transition. The 
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democratic reconstruction model has recognised shortcomings, and the 
implementation of democracy may be less realistic as a long-term solution than 
alternatives (Call and Cook, 2003: 241). Many theorists believe that democracy is a 
“prime peacebuilder and an effective confidence-building measure” in and of itself, 
simply by examining the manner in which democracies are able to resolve conflict 
(Reychler, 2001b: 216). This opinion has carried over into many peacebuilding 
processes as there are attempts to bring these post-conflict states inline with the 
“prevailing standards of domestic governance” (Paris, 2002: 638). Critical responses 
to this standardisation highlight the problems of assuming democracy and the liberal 
market economy are superior to all alternatives, and the pressure of applying this 
system on others could be considered as a modern version of colonialism (ibid: 638). 
This debate can be furthered through this categorical comparison between case 
studies, and is included here as an important factor. 
 
It is also important to realise that there are norms of domestic governance acting as a 
set of traditions and rules that define how states should govern themselves internally 
(Paris, 2000: 36). While many are accepted at the international level, there is a wide 
variation of regional norms, despite the desire of larger states to enforce similar forms 
of governance. Peacebuilding efforts may act as a rationale to convey these norms 
onto post-conflict states that lack coherent governance (Paris, 2000: 36). 
Consequently, the system of post-conflict governance is important, but it is also 
critical to conceive which system of governance is implemented on the state during 
the reconstruction phase. 
 
There is a substantial body of work that discusses the value of democracy to the peace 
process. In general, the argument follows that states with a tradition of negotiation 
and bargaining have more capability to enable discourse between opposing parties. A 
system that allows this provides an outlet for frustration without a high degree of 
aggression building up and leading to violence. Internal conflict resolution is therefore 
part of the governance category as it is constructive to link a government’s capacity to 
successfully negotiate with its aggressive opponents and secure a peaceful resolution 
rather than end in violent civil conflict.  
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4.4d Reconstruction 
 
Reconstruction is a catchall phrase for the efforts to repair all the elements damaged 
or destroyed by the conflict, whether it is tangible or intangible. There are a variety of 
ways this occurs, and their targets vary based on the techniques utilised. This category 
is probably the most focused upon for case studies, since it is the most readily 
apparent for peacebuilding decision-making processes.  
 
Reconstruction is a very practical component, as there is an immediate need to repair 
the disruption of physical infrastructures and support networks done as parties sought 
short-term goals during the conflict (Jeong, 2000:193). The reconstruction phase is 
difficult to achieve as the mere signing of peace treaties and promises of aid don’t 
necessarily mean that peace and aid will be delivered (Labonte, 2003: 269). All too 
often a pledge of aid fails to manifest, jeopardising the attempts to repair the damaged 
state and provide basic needs to the victims of conflict. One part of this category thus 
concerns determining the level of aid that actually reaches the post-conflict state. 
 
There are fairly typical approaches to applying reconstruction, and these include the 
commonly accepted models required prior to foreign or external aid being supplied. 
Reconstruction efforts tend to promote the typical liberal market model, especially as 
part of peace agreements and assistance from external sources. International agencies 
tend to offer advice and experts to assist, but will likely operate within certain 
parameters that promote the accepted forms of governance (Paris, 2000: 37). It is 
important when determining how reconstruction takes place that the requirements of 
that aid is taken into account. Some states may choose to ignore these requirements or 
only introduce selected concepts. This may indicate the relative success or failure of 
external rules, or even why some aid is reduced from that expected.  
 
The more tangible part of the developmental phase considers the rebuilding of 
physical systems such as transportation networks, banking, education and agriculture 
(Jeong, 2005: 123). The ability to initiate economic recovery for reconstruction is 
often felt the most by local communities, and it takes a concerted expenditure of 
foreign aid to allow sustainable redevelopment. The long-term benefits of economic 
rehabilitation are evident in the need for programmes that transcend immediate 
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problems. Because of this, infrastructure-rebuilding programs need sufficient and 
determined funding for success, indicating that both the level and duration of funding 
must be included in any peacebuilding model (Jeong, 2005: 134). Tracking of each 
overall change is less important in a scheme than examining the degree of functions 
restored. Therefore, this category should be used to state which areas have been 
improved and fixed, without intensive examination of how they were restored, as this 
would interfere with any comparative case study. 
 
These reconstruction efforts can also be directed towards the wider social dynamics 
and the growth of individual welfare. A ‘psychotherapeutic’ approach where there is a 
focus on repairing relationships and individual perceptions is extremely important 
(Jeong, 2005: 22-23), but determining individual desires and goals is very difficult. 
This process of recovering social relationships and repairing social trauma requires 
acknowledgement of the wrongs committed and compassionate restitution or 
apologies (Jeong, 2005: 155). The difficulty in defining this or deriving culturally 
specific answers requires an intense and personal level of research, and as a result is 
not suitable for this scale of theory design. Despite it’s lack of inclusion in this 
project, it is sufficient to understand that the psychological disposition of conflict 
participants is vital to long term stability. 
 
4.4e Resolution 
 
For many years prior to modern peace research the signing of cease-fire agreements 
signified a successful conflict resolution. Recent studies have begun to examine the 
actual effectiveness of those agreements and evaluate their actual long-term success. 
While traditional conflict realists may identify agreements as merely non-binding 
written promises, some argue that these agreements can contain mechanisms that 
transcend the cease-fire and improve the durability of the peace (Fortna, 2003: 338). 
 
An existing peace agreement that ended a previous conflict is one of the strongest 
methods of expressing underlying problems. When an agreement unravels parties may 
find that the agreement was not addressing their primary concerns or that new issues 
have arisen in the intervening time (Jeong, 2005: 6). In actuality, “peace agreements 
do not simply mark the end of an old conflict, and sometimes they contain the seed of 
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their own destruction” (Jeong, 2005: 6). While a peace agreement aims to resolve the 
most significant issues, it may exacerbate or fail to address deeper-seated problems 
that often lead to future conflict. It is possible that a weak peace agreement will not 
fundamentally alter the conflict, but rather will provide new opportunities to change 
the dynamics of the situation (Rothstein, 1999: 19). Thus, it is vital to understand the 
success of previous peace agreements and the elements they attempt to resolve, for 
doing so will decisively demonstrate the points of failure that need focus, and the 
potential for alternative means of ending the ongoing conflict. 
 
Essentially, the most important factors in determining the successfulness of a 
resolution relate to several indicators about the current situation. Positive indicators 
include whether the government is stable (and legitimate), that the intensity of the 
conflict (or degree of casualties) has remained low, that threatened groups within the 
conflict have some form of territorial provision, and that their security is assured by 
an external third party (Hartzell, et al, 2001: 202). These factors are significant to the 
probability of a previously settled conflict re-igniting. 
 
One key way to understand the buy-in by parties to a resolution is in their degree of 
demobilisation. The disbandment of armed forces, removal of weapons and 
reintegration of former combatants into a unified society has many of its own issues 
but is vital to the reduction of future conflict potential (Jeong, 2005: 46). Time 
pressure and the huge number and variety of people involved complicate any efforts 
at demobilisation. Ideally, expanded time spans allow the proper discharge of armed 
combatants without pressuring them. On many occasions these timetables are too 
short, attempting to announce that the task is finished before elections and other peace 
agreement provisions are completed (Jeong, 2005: 47). The resolution category must 
therefore be able to highlight the length of time allowed for enacting the agreement’s 
technical points, such as demobilisation and disarmament. 
 
Resolutions need a definitive and realistic time frame as the length of time between 
agreement and the potential outbreak of war is very important. After a civil war the 
“risk of rebellion goes up sharply…[fading] at about one percentage point a year” 
(Collier et al, 2003: 58), indicating that civil conflicts may very well erupt again, and 
that many years of peace are required to ensure the conflict fades into history. The 
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past conflict’s length and level of intensity can help determine the incline of this risk 
(Jeong, 2005: 24). An enduring civil conflict can create additional problems such as 
refugees and structural damage, while a large number of deaths create animosity 
between groups that a written treaty alone can’t address alone. Thus, a genuine 
agreement must be able to prevent civil conflict over a lengthy time period to be 
successful, requiring several distinct issues be addressed. 
 
There are several ways that a conflict may end other than an organised agreement. A 
conflict can be resolved through a compromise or conciliation between the parties, 
complete victory by one group through superior strength, the disappearance of the 
major issues or even a distinct lack of resolution as parties recognise the 
irreconcilable nature of the conflict (Schellenberg, 1996: 66-67). It is important in this 
resolution category to distinguish the method by which the prior conflict was 
resolved. This isn’t difficult to obtain in most cases, and there are a wide variety of 
other research pieces that examine this field. 
 
An important part of identifying a weak resolution lies in identifying specific interests 
or issues at stake. Every conflict has a set of issues or interests competed over by the 
parties involved, and while these are often the primary reasons for the original 
conflict, how they are resolved often determines the success of a given resolution. 
Perceiving what happens to those issues before another outbreak of civil conflict and 
comparing them with the ‘new’ issues in the recent conflict allows analysis into what 
attempts have been made towards resolving points of contention. The competition of 
interests between actors and any issues that remain unresolved or insufficiently 
addressed by the written resolution is important, as these are often responsible for 
conflict reoccurring. A lack of genuine commitment to the previous peace agreement 
can impact heavily on the transition process, with numerous examples of constituents 
or actors failing to commit being found throughout the conflict resolution field 
(Jeong, 2005: 7). The competing interests that may have not been addressed can easily 
perpetuate the same problems that existed earlier, requiring greater understanding of 
earlier causes. 
 
There are a number of oft-repeated conflict issues that are widely studied within the 
conflict resolution field. For example, religion can cause or abate some of the more 
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adverse conflicts, but all too often the contribution of religion to a conflict is that of 
intolerance, divisiveness or increased resistance to change (Johnston, 2005: 210). 
Other examples such as disputes over Territory, Resources, Independence, Power 
disparities or Identity can be categorised and classified more broadly than studying 
every aspect of the individual issue (Mortlock, 2006: 72). Identifying the key issues 
that have created or intensified a conflict, and how the resolution dealt with them 
during the peace transition is a pragmatic, realistic way to examine both the peace 
process and the underlying roots of a conflict. While each issue may be investigated 
in depth, the necessary scale for this across multiple case studies requires very 
specific information and lacks a broader overview. The issues in a conflict can be 
studied for what their outcome is at the end of the earlier conflict and how these were 
treated during the peace transition process, rather than studying each one at length on 
its own individual merits. Essentially, this framework treats the treatment and process 
of an issue as more important than what the individual issue happens to be as there are 
large volumes of work that suggest the best way to resolve specific issue types, and 
reinventing this would not assist the comparison process.  
 
4.5 Design Element Three: Focal points 
 
Combining the two approaches of Temporal and Categorical can lead to a large model 
that would require too much information to work successfully. If every single element 
within a category were to be studied in depth across multiple time frames, the study 
would have potentially hundreds of statistical and descriptive micro-studies to 
perform. Rather, this approach suggests a series of Focal Points that these elements 
can be analysed at. As suggested earlier, issues and similar complex points may 
require specialist research into potentially dozens of interests. The identification of 
special Focal Points reduces the sheer scale of each case study, but retains 
comparative possibilities. The difficulty lies in identifying where these Focal Points 
should be created and in defining how to measure the information at each point. 
 
Rather than try and create a vast series of variables that can measure a near-infinite 
number of changes, this framework is better suited to describing relative changes. For 
example, rather than categorising leadership through statistical means such as 0 for no 
change, 1 for democratic, and so on, a brief description is all that is necessary, since 
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this is a study of multiple case studies, and not a statistical overview for broader 
analysis.  
 
The various stages that the diverse changes take place at creates a daunting timetable 
(Jeong, 2000: 194). To allow a focus on both immediate and intermediate goals 
without disrupting the overall framework requires focal points that compare a 
previous conflict and the newly erupted one. By analysing the focal points at the 
transition process, it is only those factors most likely to change that need to be 
examined, reducing the possibility of spending valuable research time on areas that 
have not been changed during the peacebuilding phase.  
 
The focal points also allow a better means of determining the success of actions 
within the transition process. Quantifiable factors such as political equality, economic 
indicators and social awareness can be counted and measured against external norms. 
Tangible outcomes allow visual and measurable progress towards desired outcomes 
(Jeong, 2005: 35). Quantifiable conditions are capable at creating theories in the peace 
studies field, as they allow statistics to measure available variables and provide 
categories for the results. This allows far more successful comparisons between case 
studies. 
 
Non-quantifiable factors such as those lacking physical substance or manifestations 
must be evaluated in a qualitative manner. Elements such as social justice, depth of 
democracy and community reconciliation are difficult to measure (Jeong, 2005: 35). 
The best means of evaluating these indicators are found in the changing psychological 
perceptions and cultural values. Confidence between groups and the perception that 
there are real positive changes happening can be seen in community behaviour and 
overall participation.  
 
This all leads to the conclusion that research can be performed at junctions in the 
categories across the model. Rather than studying every change, these junctions 
between the Prior Conflict and the Potential Conflict (or newly erupted one) can 
clearly highlight what has changed. Thus, the end model can describe the starting 
point of the categorical information suggested earlier, with these focal points 
providing information on what has specifically changed before revealing the new 
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shape of those same categories. This is more straightforward than undertaking a full 
description of every possible stage in the peace process, and allows swift insight into 
the major changes. 
 
4.6 Framework Construction and Layout 
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework is to be utilised by a variety of non-
theoretical users requires less general and more practical approaches. This is designed 
in a similar manner to that of Bercovitch’s contingency model, in that a series of 
categories exist for each period of time, as detailed earlier. The framework is detailed 
thus: 
 
 
(Figure 5: A Comparative Peacebuilding Analysis) 
 
The captions under each of the main categories are samples of the information needed 
at those levels, rather than a restrictive list as this would defeat the simpler approach 
favoured by this model. The arrows represent the focal points at which the analysis 
occurs and are the points at which actions are detected if necessary. This pictorial 
method of displaying both the categories and the differing periods in time clearly 
highlights the links and areas that need to be studied. Each category can be outlined in 
its own period, with the analysis occurring through the arrows at the focal points. In 
addition to this, a basic history and background of the conflict for supporting the case 
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study and brief summation of events allows even a cursory examination of this study 
to reveal detail on multiple conflicts. 
 
4.7 Application Description 
 
Comparative case study methods contain their own advantages over statistical 
formulations, allowing comparison of operational situations and accounting for 
specific variables that may be unquantifiable (Bennett, 2004:34). This framework 
does this by taking one case study at a time and inserting the figures and descriptions 
of each relevant field. When multiple studies have been completed the primary results 
can be compared – such as volatility of the conflict, success of the resolution or even 
the parties involved. Each area may reveal just how inflamed the conflict is, and 
whether it is a continuation of past violence, or a fresh conflict with new participants.  
 
By comparing the various case studies and the important differences between those 
that have had successful peacebuilding and those that did not, the most significant 
elements are highlighted. This does require that there is some decision making done in 
relation to determining which conflicts have had successful peacebuilding processes 
and this is covered by that category within the study. Those that have been successful 
can be identified, and then factors that are significantly different such as government 
transition, involvement of external agencies, or economic recovery can be more 
closely examined.  
 
4.8 Potential Flaws 
 
One of the problems of this form of analysis is its conceptual nature, and the difficulty 
in measuring certain factors. For instance, if war will recur “if the expected utility of 
war is greater than the expected utility of peace” (Doyle, 2000: 780) then the 
implication thereof is that these can be measured and compared on some statistical 
scale. While this is somewhat the point of this framework, the multi-disciplinary 
nature of this field implies that one result may have two or more related causes, which 
are far more difficult to measure. The concept of ‘expected’ utility is also 
problematic, as this relies on the perception values of conflict stakeholders and 
determining how certain actions are viewed or accepted by them. Thus, the problems 
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of statistical and descriptive interpretation of interrelated fields and human 
perceptions of actions or needs cannot be easily scaled for this model. 
 
Similarly, determining the success of an individual case study and its individual 
components across the Focal points is often assumed or done arbitrarily (Bercovitch, 
2006: 601). What some may consider a success due to its resumption of democratic 
obligations may be an abject failure of reconstruction, as the states infrastructure 
remains destroyed despite regular rebuilding attempts. The differing degrees of what 
can be considered a success or even the confusion of when a conflict ‘officially’ 
begins can prove difficult to include in a broader model with consistency, and thus 
some interpretation must be allowed. While this is a flaw, the categorical approach of 
this framework counters this problem to a reasonable extent. 
 
There are some conflicts that many perceive as being unable to be stopped, and they 
seem to continue regardless of attempts to resolve the conflict. These intractable 
conflicts appear to be quite common, as nearly 25% of ongoing wars in 2000 had 
persisted for over two decades (Coleman, 2000: 301). The concept of intractable 
conflicts is highly problematic for theoretical frameworks, as many rely on the 
positive belief that a conflict can be prevented, and are not unresolvable 
(Schellenberg, 1996: 212). While this is a negative viewpoint on conflict, there have 
been a number of conflicts that have lasted across multiple generations with no 
conclusion in sight. While it can be argued that sufficient time, resources and external 
support can end any conflict; these are in finite supply compared to the vast number 
of conflicts in progress. 
 
Finally, the most obvious flaw to this systematic framework is the lack of statistical 
data or structure that would lend itself to mathematical use. Many of the more detailed 
conflict resolution models currently in use (as utilised by theorists such as Sambanis, 
Bercovitch, and Paris) are able to plot with statistical certainty the related nature of 
conflict elements. While there will be some statistics used in this model, such as the 
estimated quantity of casualties, this is not a component of this study. The data this 
model would need to perform the same task with statistical certainty would require 
substantially more research and time than this thesis allows, and would be suitable for 
a larger dissertation. 
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4.9 Summary 
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework described in Figure 5 is derived from the 
concepts of earlier conflict models, and uses a categorical approach to allow proper 
identification of conflict factors. It is a highly suitable technique to examine a series 
of conflicts and provides a straightforward method to compare these case studies and 
highlight their key differences. While there are a variety of flaws inherent in this 
approach, these flaws are the same as those associated with a number of models 
regardless of their design, and as such are outweighed by the benefits of this 
approach. The case studies to be performed should indicate the key differences 
between the cases, and taking their relative successes into account will reveal the 
major fluctuations between them. This should allow peacebuilding agencies a clearer 
view of how to approach a post-conflict reconstruction situation with a broader 
conception of what is likely to reintroduce conflict to that state. 
 
4.10 Cases for Analysis 
 
Each case displays different characteristics of a civil conflict such as political tension, 
clashes over identity, resource control and unresolved historic grievances. By using 
cases from the same region cultural similarities and traditions have less bearing on 
differences between the cases, allowing the dominant, unique factors in each case to 
be more apparent. The framework displays the complexities of each situation and 
provides a short analysis of the success and failures of each case. This allows a full 
examination of the frameworks success and highlights key areas to be improved for 
similar frameworks in the future. It is important to note that the case studies do not 
seek to reveal new information or provide previously unknown approaches or theories 
to peacebuilding, but rather they demonstrate the effectiveness of using a model to 
find commonalities between cases. Furthermore, these studies highlight the main 
factors in each case while testing the model to find potential criticisms.  
 
To illustrate this application three conflicts have been chosen - the secessionist war in 
Bougainville, the reoccurring coups in Fiji and the complicated civil strife in the 
Solomon Islands. Each conflict demonstrates a differing failing in the respective 
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peacebuilding phase. The use of the model illustrates the different causes of each 
conflict, and highlights why each conflict has reoccurred.  
 
The Bougainville conflict is an example of a weak resolution followed by 
uncoordinated peacebuilding. Substantial reconstruction was not undertaken, but 
reconciliation and political changes were sufficient to reduce the prospects of overall 
violence, reducing it to sporadic rebellion in later conflicts. The aspects that were 
successful are clearly highlighted by the framework while the persistent problems that 
failed to be addressed such as identity can be seen in context. The lack of a clear 
resolution early in the Bougainville strife is shown as both prolonging the conflict, but 
also ultimately allowing simmering tensions to fade, creating an environment where 
peaceful negotiation was possible despite underlying tensions and unresolvable 
problems. Bougainville was chosen for this study because it represents a conflict 
perpetuated by an incomplete peacebuilding phase and a neglect to disarm all the 
warring parties. 
 
The second case study is the small island chain of Fiji that has had significant civil 
conflict in the last two decades, with multiple coups and political destabilisation 
stemming from endemic inter-ethnic tension. A pair of coups in 1987 introduced the 
military as a political actor during an army-led coup, and the developments afterwards 
failed to address this situation. Constitutional analysis and political changes were 
unable to reduce ethnic tensions, and the coup in 2000 erupted as a result of a political 
victory that was unpopular with the indigenous elite. The framework clearly 
demonstrates these problems and what is likely necessary to prevent future unrest. 
This case was selected due to the constitutional and political nature of the conflict 
rather than extensive civil war, and because it displays the importance of both 
underlying issues and the military’s potential role in state development. 
 
The final case study is the highly complex Solomon Islands conflict that lasted 
between 1998 and 2003 with severe population displacement and complete failure of 
the state structures. Historic grievances against a population shift post-World War 
Two remained unresolved, and combined with a declining capacity to retain the 
traditional patronage system, inexorably led to open conflict between the two largest 
ethnic groups. A large foreign intervention effort managed to subdue the outright 
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conflict, but a dissatisfactory election result in 2006 turned violent and subsequent 
riots destroyed many buildings in the central Honiara business district. The inability 
to change the traditional practices that fuelled the original conflict despite the lengthy 
disarmament process meant that the same conflict triggers remained active. The 
Solomon Islands conflict is important to study with this model as it clearly shows how 
unresolved political corruption and unchanged perceptions of traditional politics can 
deter any peace process. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
Application of the Framework - Bougainville 
 
5.1 Bougainville Introduction 
 
The Bougainville conflict is highly regarded in the Pacific as an example of 
successful mediation and negotiation strategies applied by third party mediators and 
as an example of post-conflict reconciliation. The large number of casualties, threat to 
Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty, and implications of cultural dissociation and 
resonance with wider independence struggles increases the importance of this conflict 
as a topic of study. Lasting a decade, the island conflict was small on the international 
stage, but in relation to the sparsely populated pacific islands, this incident became 
one of the regions worst contemporary disputes (Peebles, 2005: 29). Beginning in 
1989, the conflict escalated over the primary issues of resource control and 
independence. The conflict was not formally ended until 1998 with the signing of the 
Lincoln accord (Peebles, 2005: 164). For this case study, the prior conflict will refer 
to the initial violence between the pro-independence rebels and the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) that was resolved when the PNGDF withdrew to 
form a blockade rather than continue overt violence. The second conflict Event is 
considered to be the isolated insurrection attempts and social disruption after the 
Sandline incident and Lincoln peace accord, with the interim period between acting as 
the Transition phase. While not completely suitable as a Peacebuilding phase, there 
were attempts to repair the islands infrastructure and resolve key issues, which 
illustrate how the violence would have perpetuated if the transition phase had not 
occurred. 
 
5.2 Background 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has a long history of colonial control. Originally occupied 
by Germany in 1886 and incorporated into the wider German New Guinea until war 
in 1914 when PNG became administered by Australia as Germany lost its grip on the 
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pacific state (Rosanowski, 2001: 35-38). A growing desire for independence 
manifested in 1975 as PNG separated from Australia, with full autonomy and 
territorial sovereignty. Last minute protests by Bougainville political activists gained 
the island a measure of regional autonomy, and significantly, emphasised their 
cultural and ethnic differences to mainland PNG (Rosanowski, 2001: 39).  
 
Bougainville is a small island located to the northeast of Papua New Guinea, lying 
about 800 kilometres from Port Moresby, and is physically closer to the Solomon 
Islands than PNG (Claxton, 1998: 7). It is rich in mineral resources, and has 
substantial forestry and fishing opportunities (Hayes, 2005: 141). During the period of 
Australian colonial control the mining firm Conzinc Riotinti of Australia (CRA) 
established Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) in 1967 and gained the rights to 
prospect for gold and copper deposits in the Panguna area (Connell, 1990: 43). This 
agreement remained in place after PNG gained independence and a large percentage 
of their profits went to the PNG national government in exchange for continuing 
mining rights. Bougainville’s resource abundance has made it an important financial 
contributor to PNG and any disruption to this supply has far reaching political and 
economic implications. 
 
5.3 Prior Conflict 
 
Beginning in1989, the decade long conflict has more than 10,000 casualties and over 
50,000 people were displaced during the incident, a high number given the total 
population of 160,000 (Downer, 2001: 1). The conflict began as the Panguna 
Landowners Association (PLA), acting on behalf of those living near the Panguna 
copper mine, gained attention from BCL and the PNG government as they brought to 
light the mine’s negative impact on their quality of life. Starting peacefully, a political 
change in the PLA during the late 1980’s resulted in a swing towards more overt 
defiance and a push for autonomy and mine control (Havini, 1990: 25). When the 
mine was sabotaged, a rebel group formed who were determined to prevent the mine 
from operating while the perceived injustices remained in force2. 
                                                 
2
 While the mine has remained closed since the start of the conflict, recent government investigations 
into reopening the mine has met with aggressive protests. This illustrates how some issues have not 
been dealt with, and may be so fundamental to the tension that they cannot be resolved. 
Page 65 
 
At the time of the conflict the mine contributed nearly half of PNG’s foreign 
exchange earnings, but a huge share of mine profit went to BCL shareholders, with 
small amounts being gifted to the Bougainville PLA to develop roads and 
infrastructure (Hayes, 2005: 141; Peebles, 2005: 26). Between 1972 and 1989 (when 
the mine became closed) the relative shares of the wealth were: 
 
 Kmillion Percent 
National Government 1,078 61.5% 
Provincial Government 75 4.3% 
Landholders 24 1.4% 
Non-governmental shareholders 577 32.8% 
 1,754 100.0% 
 
(Figure 6: Relative Share of BCL Mine Profits (Carruthers, 1990: 41)) 
 
While the Road, Mine, Tailings Lease Trust Fund (RMTLTF) was created to 
distribute some finance on behalf of the PLA, this was regularly perceived as being 
poorly used and of insufficient quantities (May, 2005:8; Okole, 1990: 17-18).  
 
5.3a Involvement 
 
There were several parties involved in the crisis, with the main actors in this initial 
period being identified as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the PNG 
national government (Claxton, 1998: 8). The national government has a dual 
personality with the PNGDF as a unique identity within the PNG government 
(Martin, 2003: 2). These parties were consistent throughout the main conflict as 
central actors and played critical roles. 
 
The PNG national government was highly active during this conflict, as they did not 
want to lose their largest economic contributor. The defence force gained a terrible 
reputation during the initial stages of the conflict, as the elite forces ‘brutal’ retaliatory 
strikes would polarise the local populace (May, 2005: 460, 465; Downer, 2001: 12-
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13). PNG saw this conflict as not only a danger to its economical stability, but also as 
a threat to its sovereignty and power given the multitude of individual identity groups 
in its territory (Claxton, 1998: 43). In this conflict, the PNGDF acted at a higher level, 
as the national defence force rather than as an equal to the revolutionary forces.  
 
The dominant rebel force, known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
was led by a strong individual key figure that was involved in all stages of the 
Bougainville conflict. Fancis Ona, a disgruntled mine worker and member of the PLA 
took the issues of the environmental damage, unfair allocation of financial gains and 
Bougainvillean independence as leverage, and sabotaged the mines operational 
capacities (Peebles, 2005:26; Hoadley, 2005: 8; Havini, 1990: 25). He acted as the 
political leader of the rebel movement with ex-military figures like Sam Kauona 
leading the BRA in the field, leaving Ona free to negotiate during the conflict without 
being active in the violence. The BRA declared the region around the mine to now be 
the Independent Republic of Me’ekamui, and established the Bougainville Interim 
Government (BIG) as a means of assuming some mantle of authority in lieu of the 
PNG government (May, 2005: 460). Ona and the BRA were representative of a 
ground-swell movement that not only reflected the armed minority, but also that of 
strong individual level leadership.  
 
As the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework requires, this clearly identifies the 
eminent parties during the conflict period as being the PNG national government and 
attached armed forces, and the BRA. Their goals were directly incompatible, with the 
mines status and Bougainvillean independence irreconcilable and providing the 
motivation for each party. Finally, the capacity of both the PNGDF and BRA to carry 
out the conflict is highlighted within the involvement category by displaying both the 
power imbalance and complement of leadership. 
 
5.3b Governance 
 
The PNG government was responsible for administering national laws over 
Bougainville such as taxation and judicial proceedings. With a democratic system of 
government and functioning judicial system, the state appears to have the machinery 
to cope with conflict resolution. In practice however, there is substantial corruption 
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and inequality of representation within the national government that has prevented 
both the state of PNG from functioning at maximum capacity, and the successful 
integration of Bougainville into the greater whole of PNG (Watson, 2005a: 453). 
However grassroots populism often exceeds democratic acceptance so that the 
individual landowners in the resource rich country hold tremendous power (Claxton, 
1998: 51). It is this dualism of control and the existence of weak central authority that 
artificially lent governance authority to local bodies and aided the BRA’s ground level 
support. 
 
While not a recognised governance body, the Panguna Landowners Association 
(PLA) controlled finance and operations in the Panguna region. Controlling some 
mine profits they assisted domestic development. The expenditure was often debated, 
leading to some loss of faith in the PLA. When a number of disgruntled leaders 
protested BCL’s overwhelming mine profits, there was a change in the PLA 
leadership. They were able to gain significant support but undermined any 
consistency of domestic governance. The ‘new’ PLA seemed incorruptible and 
focused on resuscitating the key issues in Bougainville, creating a vast well of 
support, especially in the mine region (Okole, 1990: 20-22). The failure of the PLA to 
adequately satisfy some constituents gave some ground level credence to the BRA’s 
complaints and reinforced the perception that their actions were justified. In this case, 
the people who benefited the most from the mine gained nearly the least from it, 
leading to intense friction. 
 
This use of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework’s governance category 
illustrates that PNG’s ability to govern over Bougainville was compromised, with 
corruption, a lack of a national identity and the dominance of local landowners 
hampered their efforts to curtail the conflict. While the mine gave the PLA significant 
economic advantages, these advantages were only present in the Panguna region. The 
model has clearly shown both the failures of national governance and the implications 
this had for fuelling the conflict. 
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5.3c Structural 
 
As Bougainville is an isolated island, the conflict did not directly impact wider state 
structures, however physical damage in Bougainville was widespread. The damage to 
the mine, roads and private businesses completely removed substantial income from 
the region and combined with the blockade prevented the functioning of any unarmed 
government institutions.  
 
A secondary impact on the structure of living opportunities within Bougainville is that 
of the loss of opportunity amongst the subsistence population. The environmental 
damage from the mine (in its tailings) was witnessed to have been detrimental to local 
fish and crop gatherings (Connell, 1990:53). This created unequal balance in the 
differing sectors of civil society, with those based in the cities better able to sustain 
themselves over those relying on subsistence existence.  
 
The framework thus highlights the damage to local-state infrastructure, but more 
importantly the imbalance in gains from the source of the conflict. It also 
demonstrates that by not mentioning the local police and military in the structural 
section, that these are either irrelevant to the greater case study or covered as part of 
national governance. This category is relevant to the Comparative Peacebuilding 
Framework as it indicates the importance of domestic governance, considering its 
impact on internal political discord and development of elite landowners. 
 
5.3d Resolution 
 
The PNGDF withdrew from Bougainville in mid 1990, relying on an extensive 
embargo and blockade of Bougainville in an attempt to reduce violence and the 
rebel’s domestic support (Claxton, 1998: 9-10). This was not necessarily a desired 
resolution and was more a recognition of stalemate than peaceful acceptance. The key 
issues such as mine revenue and independence remained unresolved (Martin, 2003: 
2). The nature of this poor resolution meant there was little buy-in from involved 
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parties and the conflict merely simmered beneath the surface3. By studying the 
resolution within its own section of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework, the 
significant weakness of this form of resolution and its heightening of long-term 
suffering are highlighted separately from other factors or events within the wider 
conflict. 
 
5.4 Transformative Process 
 
The period following the PNGDF withdrawal and blockade led to a reduction in 
clashes and allowed some attempt at negotiation and settlement by the Bougainville 
rebel forces. The military was able to reduce the opportunities for violence against 
them, rather than being an ever-present force that could be fought against (Rimoldi, 
2005:95). By 1997 the overall conflict had continued for eight years, and a slow, 
grass-roots desire for peace talks developed (Tapi, 2002), as emphasised in the wake 
of the Sandline incident. The subsequent reaction by the PNGDF and their absolute 
rejection of mercenary tactics displayed a willingness to adopt a softer line than 
previously imagined, demonstrating to the BRA that their opposition wasn’t prepared 
to continue with the aggressive tactics previously employed (Peebles, 2005: 163).  
 
This period was marked by a regular series of negotiations between the PNG 
government and the BRA’s political body, the BIG aiming to reconcile and restore 
state functions. While there were several agreements made they were never fully 
implemented, with some friction splintering the political and military bodies of the 
Bougainville forces (Claxton, 1998: 10-11). This process did reinforce the decision-
making capabilities of domestic leaders, and since the Burnham Accord in 1998 there 
has not been any further full-scale violence4. This area describes the transitional 
period and associated peacebuilding within the Comparative Peacebuilding 
Framework. 
                                                 
3
 It is also important to note that the majority of the deaths occurring during the wider Bougainville 
conflict took place because of this embargo. Malaria medicines, food and other vital supplies were 
prevented from reaching the island, causing immense suffering over an extended period. This 
difference between overt violence and hostile neglect is important, as while the individual clashes 
significantly reduced, the overall suffering actually increased. 
4
 There have been a number of small skirmishes primarily in regards to revenge attacks, possession of 
surrendered firearms, and pressing to detain or arrest suspected militants. These have not converted to 
systematic violence, but do signify some capacity to do so in the future.  
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5.4a Involvement 
 
This period introduces one significant and complicated actor to this conflict – 
Australia. There was a strong perception in Bougainville during the conflict that 
Australia was more interested in a strong PNG than the rights of Bougainvilleans 
(Downer, 2001: 3), with their support for the mining operation and earlier political 
colonial rule seemingly strong indicators of this bias (Puddicombe, 2001: 140). The 
further gift of four Iroquois helicopters and patrol vessels to assist the PNGDF in their 
repression of Bougainville rebels was accompanied by verbal acknowledgement that 
PNG had legitimacy to respond to the ‘armed rebellion’ and should use that power 
(Downer, 2001: 8-9; Puddicombe, 2001: 140-141; John, 1999: 24). Australia was thus 
perceived as being highly partial and directly allied with PNG against the BRA5. 
 
The BRA was still highly motivated and had enhanced their involvement in local 
political governance in the aftermath of the PNGDF withdrawal. Creating an interim 
government, the political body BIG, they justified a governance approach to the island 
in lieu of PNG authority. This also allowed separation of those involved in peace 
discussions from those carrying out violent action. In 1995 this body transferred 
authority to the newly established Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) 
under the auspices of earlier peace attempts, and while peace talks were halted this 
still gave a strong indication that the PNG government was closer to granting 
Bougainville increased autonomy (May, 2005: 462).  
 
The situation in PNG changed substantially later in this period. A 1997 surge in 
military activity led to a lack of domestic PNG support for the PNGDF’s actions. The 
government strove to end the conflict swiftly, and signed a contract with South 
African based mercenary organisation Sandline International to enable the 
assassination of key BRA leadership figures (Claxton, 1998: 15). This resulted in a 
partial revolution by the PNGDF, as key military leaders sparked a constitutional 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that there were pro-PNG forces within Bougainville (such as the Bougainville 
Resistance Forces (BRF)) but they lacked real emphasis in changing the overall situation (May, 2005: 
460). They did, however, invite the PNGDF and Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) to 
Northern Bougainville. While some restoration of services occurred they were not substantial enough 
to have real impact on the political period. 
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crisis by demanding the resignation of PNG politicians due to the perception that the 
PNGDF’s position and authority was being usurped by their own government 
(Claxton, 1998: 16-17). This signalled a change in momentum towards finding a 
peaceful alternative to violence and radically altered the perception of the PNGDF.  
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework illustrates the changing attitudes between 
the eminent parties, their adjusting motivations and the introduction of Australia to 
the dispute, demonstrating that the new period in the conflict is clearly different. This 
has highlighted which parties were still primarily involved in the peacebuilding phase 
and how they changed over time. This is important as it allows further comparison of 
the nature of each party taking part in the second conflict 
 
5.4b Governance 
 
The intermediate successes of the multiple peace attempts led to an increase in trust, 
with the transitional government symbolising an increase in local authority (Claxton, 
1998: 13). The BTG was able to act as a form of transitional authority, beginning to 
plan for post-conflict reconstruction, and entering discussions with constitutional 
experts in developing an acceptable alternative to the semi-autonomous status quo. 
This was the underlying political transition that accelerated the Lincoln Peace Accord 
discussions in 1998. The legitimacy of the BTG was also a significant factor as they 
managed to represent the BRA politically and consider the original issues without 
being overwhelmed by tertiary concerns.  
 
The use of the framework here highlights that during this period the development of a 
legitimate transitional authority was the primary governance event, as it allowed 
increased discussions between the parties. It also points out the levels of corruption 
and the type of government in the peacebuilding process, and indicates that the key 
concerns were about creating a political environment where trusted discussions could 
occur rather than rebuilding state institutions or developing a national identity. 
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5.4c Reconstruction 
 
During the 1990-1998 period there were few attempts by local authorities to repair the 
physical damage done to Bougainville. In 1990 local supporters in Northern 
Bougainville attempted to restore local services with some success by allowing the 
PNGDF in, but delays and the blockade prevented wider reconstruction (May, 2005: 
460). The best reconstruction that did occur was that of faction demobilisation. With 
the BRA cutting short many of its most overt actions, the levels of violence dropped 
and with the PNGDF restricting its actions to friendly territory the more aggressive 
parties were effectively demobilising. This ‘quietening’ of the overt conflict is akin to 
post-conflict demobilisation and reconciliation actions and thus acts as a form of civil 
society reconstruction.  
 
The frameworks categorical approach suggests that little physical reconstruction has 
taken place during the peacebuilding period, with the mine remaining closed and 
many transportation routes untenable. Because of this, little progress could be made 
into restoring the economic strength of Bougainville and indicated poor development 
during the transitional period. 
 
5.4d Reconciliation 
 
There were multiple peace attempts during this transition phase, including the 
Endeavour talks in 1990, and extensive discussions in 1991 (Honiara), 1994 (Arawa) 
and 1995 (Cairns), but these were never conducted in a truly impartial fashion 
(Downer, 2001: 4, 11-13). The presence of the news media and the swift flow of 
information to the party’s constituents created overwhelming pressure to save face 
and stay firm on key issues (Rosanowski, 2001: 136).  
 
Both the BRA and PNG adversaries came to the realisation that the conflict was 
draining, both in resources and lives, and that the cost had risen too high to continue 
(Mortlock, 2005: 471-472). Peace talks in 1997 were held in New Zealand, using a 
facilitative technique that ensured that Bougainvilleans were able to direct the 
resolution on an informal basis without being directed or coerced into peace (Hayes, 
2005: 143). This proved a highly successful meeting, with the impartial New Zealand 
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setting, secretive and informal agenda, and a strong willingness to succeed. This 
prevented any societal fractioning and repaired the damaged relationships.  
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework illustrates that the attempt to rebuild 
relationships between the parties and reduce overall hostility was significantly 
affected by the multiple rounds of peace talks. This provided sufficient reconciliation 
between the main parties to allow a final, successful peace agreement to be made. 
This fulfils the reconciliation category as it indicates how some parties were brought 
together to put the violent history behind them. 
 
5.5 Conflict Event 
 
In 1997 a successful round of negotiations at Burnham in New Zealand was able to 
end the overt violence. A New Zealand led Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was 
established to observe the truce and notify all parties of any potential breaches before 
being replaced by a more extensive Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in 1998 (Alpers 
and Twyford, 2003: 45; Peebles, 2005: 164; Mortlock, 2005: 211). Despite the 
apparent success, conflict was not completed averted. Francis Ona, the original 
activist behind the creation of the BRA, disagreed with the peace accord. Creating a 
separatist group named the Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF) (named after the 
indigenous title of the Panguna region), with the self-aggrandising title of King, Ona 
refused to disarm his troops and blockaded the mine and immediate surrounds (May, 
2005: 465). There were also political problems in establishing a new constitution to 
introduce the components of the peace agreement. While a first draft was written by 
2003, the process was delayed for months by a reluctant Attorney General’s 
department (May, 2005: 464). This describes the reoccurrence of conflict in 1997 as 
the Conflict Event category in the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework.  
 
5.5a Involvement 
 
New Zealand was an important actor during this period, both to the conflict and for 
establishing a role in the region as “the Bougainville peace process is an example of 
the important part New Zealand can play in the resolution of security problems in 
[their] region” (Henderson, 1999: 1). Their lack of history and geographical distance 
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from PNG ensured they were seen as unbiased, but still close enough to show a 
‘genuine’ concern and interest in ending the conflict (Henderson, 1999: 3). The 
willingness to commit forces and intervene in this process was seen as a benevolent 
act by the conflict parties, and ensured external commitment was guaranteed and 
trusted. 
 
Ona’s MDF is vital to this stage, and forms the dominant antagonist in the post-accord 
period. When the group announced unilateral independence, they blockaded the 
Panguna region, effectively creating a ‘no-go’ area (Rimoldi, 2005: 98). While they 
initially agreed not to disrupt the peace process, they have consistently resisted overall 
reconstruction, as their sporadic violence against law enforcement, use of illegal 
means to gather equipment, disruption of electoral processes and blockade of the mine 
have contributed to a continuation of lawlessness in the Panguna region (May, 2005: 
464). While Ona died from Malaria6 in 2005 (ABC, 2005), his group has continued to 
be dominant in the Panguna region, resorting to violence on numerous occasions 
(May, 2005: 464) and while the police forces have attempted to eradicate the groups 
support structures and physical presence, they continue to prove elusive. As recent as 
March 2008, the group continued to be active with sporadic armed violence against 
the local police resulting in four fatalities (Fiji Times, 2008).  
 
By outlining the exact identity, goals and capacity of the two primary parties in the 
conflict, the framework has shown how the most important aspects of the parties 
involved can be quickly highlighted. It also shows how the parties have differed from 
the original conflict, with the BRA becoming the MDF, while the PNG national 
government is replaced by New Zealand as the larger power seeking to end the 
conflict. This forms the involvement category of the framework as it allows the 
parties involved as this stage to be compared with their same role in previous periods. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Anecdotal reports have indicated that reports of his sickness were exaggerated, and that his death was 
of a suspicious nature. Due to the secretive interests of the Me’ekamui group, the truth is likely to 
remain obfuscated. 
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5.5b Governance 
 
The Lincoln accord was able to partially resolve the primary outstanding issue of 
independence and autonomy for Bougainville, adding increased powers for 
Bougainville’s government, and re-evaluating their autonomous status within PNG, 
all to occur in a set time frame (about 10-15 years from the signing, dependent on 
disarmament criteria) (Peebles, 2005: 164-165). This progress was significant, as it 
underlined the separate identity of Bougainville. However, without the mines 
operational income their power is heavily reduced and this remains a critical issue for 
lawmakers. This also fuelled a response from the Me’ekamui group, who rapidly 
destabilised the Panguna area, preventing complete governance control over the island 
(May, 2005: 465). A strong record of equal representation from several groups 
combined with a widespread public satisfaction in the peace process, has resulted in a 
strong local government and willingness to succeed that has resisted any return to 
conflict (Tanis, 2002).  
 
The concepts of Bougainville independence or greater national identity, coupled with 
the illustration of weak government control are perfect examples of how the 
framework studies governance. It also highlights the change in participation from the 
PLA to an armed militia that exacerbated the situation. This completes the governance 
category within the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework, as it describes the power 
of the local government and the ability of that government to control its territory. 
 
5.5c Structural 
 
The institutional power in Bougainville is still developing, with state structures in 
their infancy due to constitutional delays. Police and judicial systems were national 
services so have easily reintegrated. This means that aside from private institutions 
(such as local businesses) the main structures responsible for the successful running of 
the island region remain intact.  
 
Since the mine was widely believed to be a source of social inequality that 
exacerbated the gaps between rich and poor, the mine remaining closed seems a 
comfort for many (May, 2005: 465). Ironically, the original mine agreements were 
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widely seen as good examples of techniques that incorporate the local population as a 
significant party. This has led to the current belief that any widespread resource 
gathering in Papua New Guinea will generate the same volatile grievances (Filer, 
1990: 76). Thus, while the revenue from the mine is curtailed Bougainville will likely 
remain peaceful.  
 
The continued closure of the mine should decrease the imbalance between the elite 
landowners and the subsistence farmers, as the wealth it generated failed to be 
directed at targeted areas. However, without the scholarships, higher-level 
employment or other spin-off effects of the mine, there is less opportunity to excel as 
a citizen of Bougainville (Carruthers, 1990: 39).  
 
The framework successfully isolates the structural problems in Bougainville and 
enables direct comparison to the earlier position during which financial benefits from 
the mine were unequally distributed to local landowners, reducing the power of the 
growing elite landowner class, and highlighting the plight of individual opportunity 
across all Bougainville. This shows that the framework is best used to highlight the 
main components of a category, and in this case describes a situation where the 
structure of Bougainville during the second conflict was not substantially different to 
the earlier conflict period.  
 
5.5d Causes of Strife 
 
Despite the increased autonomy guaranteed through the Lincoln accord, the MDF has 
resisted the attempts to consolidate internal leadership. The MDF’s factional fighting 
has led to competition for control over both the rights to the reconstruction process 
and to be the dominant figures in their regions (May, 2005: 465). The aftermath has 
left the two central issues of the conflict unresolved: independence and control of the 
Panguna mine. While independence has a planned timetable, with agreed processes 
and signposts to indicate success to the wider regional authorities, the control of the 
mine is far more complicated. The mine can be seen as the catalyst (rather than the 
sole issue) for the entire violent situation in Bougainville, as the initial conflict wasn’t 
directly about independence or closure of the mine, but rather about equality and 
distribution of finance (Regan, 2003: 133). The temporary removal of the mine from 
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the ongoing reconstruction and resistance has ensured the ground level support 
remains firmly in favour of peaceful restitution. 
 
5.6 Analysis of Success or Failure 
 
The Bougainville conflicts and intervening peacebuilding period is important in 
considering the impact of one central issue as a flash point to simmering controversy. 
The peace agreements have been very successful, with a reduction in the wider issues 
and concerns over identity, but have effectively left the trigger concern to be 
addressed at a later time. The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework has highlighted 
some of the key differences in each period of the conflict, including the initial conflict 
and the later resistance movements that took place during the transition phase.  
 
The parties involved in the conflict have changed dramatically. While the BRA was a 
widespread resistance group with ground level support in Bougainville, the 
Me’ekamui are isolated, acting like an armed gang and are unable to increase their 
size or momentum as the public has widely accepted the current status quo. The 
opponents to the resistance have changed, with the Me’ekamui resisting the 
Bougainville internal government and its organs rather than the overbearing PNG 
military. The use of a foreign group to monitor the truce was significant, as it 
involved a deep level of trust between the parties and an acceptance of international 
pressure. These differences in the parties involved are very important, as they 
demonstrate the ease with which this framework highlights one major change that has 
been a key factor in the reduction of violence. The demobilisation of the BRA and the 
changing PNG political environment undid the stalemate that had developed, allowing 
a fresh opportunities for peace that was gladly accepted by most of those involved. 
 
5.7 Framework Analysis 
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework shows some of the key differences in the 
initial conflict and its reoccurrence. This information can be inserted into a 
reproduction of the framework, with highlights applied to the significant changes or 
similarities. Presented in Figure 7, the information is insufficient to determine the 
implications, but is sufficient to reflect upon the aforementioned data. 
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This table quickly displays the most significant elements at each stage, with a brief 
summary provided. For example, it shows that the most significant change for those 
involved was the removal of the state as a direct adversary to the conflict aggressor, 
while the outsider changed from a biased to trusted mediator. Instead of the aggressor 
fighting against an overpowering state, the MDF began fighting their own constituents 
and those who were previously on their own side. Equally, the structural changes 
describe the broken transport networks, lack of job opportunities and economic sector 
collapse.  
 
These major changes can be incorporated into the framework and they highlight 
several key factors in the Bougainville peacebuilding effort. The change in the parties 
involved is important as it indicates how the MDF was unable to rally popular 
support, preventing the growth of a wider conflict. The governance changes reflect a 
reduction in the power of landowners around the Panguna region as national 
governance and increased Bougainville autonomy grew in strength. The economy of 
Bougainville had been severely damaged, with less job opportunities, broken transport 
networks and a significant decline in finance given the closure of the mine. As the 
first conflict merely ended in a punishing stalemate, little headway was undertaken to 
resolve resource control issues and as the peacebuilding period merely put this aside 
for later discussion, the mine’s influence has remained a cause for strife. 
 
The framework has thus shown some of the positive effects of the peace process in 
disarming, but more readily highlighted the significant negative implications of the 
economic situation in Bougainville. It also suggests that any attempt by PNG to 
reopen the mine or prevent increased autonomy may cause the conflict to flare up, and 
as such is a situation that must be treated carefully. 
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Chapter Six: 
 
Application of the Framework - Fiji 
 
6.1 Fiji Introduction 
 
Fiji has had a series of coups over the last two decades erupting from simmering 
ethnic tensions. The larger indigenous Fijian population overshadows those of Indian 
descent, and the duality of Fijian identity has continued to dominate both the political 
climate and the use of state structures. In 1987 a radical nationalist movement backed 
by the military staged a coup. In the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework this acts 
as the prior conflict. This coup was entirely successful, with its leader, Rabuka able to 
gain political control and shape the subsequent transition phase. The election in 1999 
followed by the coup in 2000 serves as the conflict event with the transition period 
falling between the two coups. This serves to highlight the constitutional 
developments and the changing involvement of the military that are the central 
elements to this stage in the Fijian political environment.  
 
It is important to note that this period in Fiji’s coup history was chosen, as there are 
substantial amounts of literature on the subject, with retrospective analysis by some of 
the major participants. There was a coup in 2006, but this is still ongoing, and the 
suppression of media, news reports and academic investigation has prevented any 
clear analysis. Thus, this coup will not be analysed here but is relevant to conceiving 
how unresolved underlying issues continue to plague Fiji. 
 
6.2 Background 
 
Fiji is a state composed of a small series of islands located in the South Pacific. It is a 
divided society with about half of the population living in rural Fiji, with over a 
thousand villages within the 14 provinces of Fiji (Field et al, 2005: 24). It has a large 
mixed race population of nearly 900,000 comprised of two dominant and separate 
ethnic identities with approximately 51% identifying themselves as indigenous 
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Fijians, and 44% as those of Indian descent (Watson, 2005b: 359; Fraenkel, 2006: 
73). Fiji is unique as it has these two distinct ethnic communities of similar numerical 
value7 and a secondary divide of tribal and cross-ethnic allegiances that impact 
heavily on elections (Fraenkel, 2006: 75-76, 81). Tradition mingles with modern 
realities as chiefly leaders who are backed by popular consent are replaced by 
democratically elected politicians (Geraghty, 2007: 47). It is this combination of 
ethnicities and divided loyalty that has underscored the 1987 and 2000 coups that tore 
the elected governments from power.  
 
The Indian population was originally introduced to Fiji by the British colonial 
authorities primarily as an indentured workforce for the burgeoning sugar industry 
(Fraenkel, 2006: 73). The British colonial period was notorious for exacerbating the 
racial separation, where ‘in the compartmentalized world of colonial Fiji… the racial 
barriers were kept firmly in place by the British’ (Lal, 1988: 60). Indigenous Fijians 
also comprise the bulk of the Fijian civil service numbers and make up over 99% of 
soldiers in the military indicating a highly homogenous state structure (Fraenkel, 
2006: 73, 82; Watson, 2005b: 360). This ongoing imbalance helped to exacerbate the 
entire ethnic and elite division. 
 
Independence in 1970 introduced a constitution that entrenched indigenous Fijian 
control with an election system that encouraged voting along ethnic lines (Durutalo, 
2000: 74). Despite three different constitutions, pre-1987 politics was dominated by 
two groups that strongly identified with their corresponding ethnicities within the 
confines of the inherited Westminster parliamentary democracy (Watson, 2005b: 
360). Race is an unavoidable aspect of life in Fiji, reinforced by the constitution, and a 
powerful weapon for the opposing political parties.  
 
The 1987 coups form the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework’s Prior Conflict, 
with the societal reconstruction, institutional development and constitutional 
evolution forming the transitional period. This ends with the 2000 coup during which 
the ramifications of the transitional period become readily apparent. The dynamics of 
                                                 
7
 In recent years the extreme migration of Indo-Fijians has led to significant changes in the population 
balance. New figures indicate that only about 37% of the population are Indo-Fijian, reflecting a drastic 
shift away from Fiji (CIA, 2008). 
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each group involved, their beliefs and the elements leading up to the coups are the 
most significant aspects of the Fijian political unrest. 
 
6.3 Prior Conflict 
 
The elections in Fiji have traditionally led to power being dominated by those parties 
espousing indigenous Fijian rights. In the years leading up the 1987 elections a 
coalition of indigenous Fijian parties led by Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara 
were consistently in control of the government (Durutalo, 2000: 77). The 1987 
election was a significant turning point as the multi-ethnic Fijian Labour Party (FLP) 
led by Indo-Fijian Timoci Bavadra won 28 seats compared to the indigenous 
alliance’s 26 seats (Field et al, 2005: 37). This dramatic result provoked a strong 
response by the indigenous Taukei movement who began planning protests and 
violence in an effort to reverse the election results (Watson, 2005b: 360; Lal, 1988: 
38). A month after Bavadra took office, Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka ordered a 
coup and seized Parliament with the support of most of the armed forces and leaders 
of the Taukei movement on the 14th of May 1987 (Watson, 2005b: 360). Despite 
Rabuka’s intentions for a swift decisive coup, rioting and destruction of public 
property by the Taukei movement took place, which also included a mass release of 
prisoners for a political march and protest (Lal, 1988: 114-115). 
 
Rabuka reinstated Ratu Mara, but when Mara reached an agreement with the ousted 
Bavadra to form a united administration contrary to Rabuka’s wishes, he mounted a 
second coup on September 25th, unilaterally transforming Fiji into a republic as they 
scrapped the 1970 constitution  (Watson, 2005b: 360; Field et al, 2005: 42). This 
second coup was much better organised and executed, with curfews, travel bans, and 
widespread arrests of potential ‘trouble-makers’ (Lal, 1988: 118). It was this second 
coup that kept power consolidated away from the multi-ethnic political parties and 
signalled an effective end to the initial conflict period. 
 
6.3a Involvement 
 
Sitiveni Rabuka was a high-ranking officer in the Fijian military with substantial 
contacts and personal history within the indigenous Fijian population (Rabuka, 2000: 
Page 83 
10-11). He justified the coup in the belief that he prevented greater bloodshed and 
violence by the Taukei group (Lal, 1988: 8). He believed that the Taukei movement 
would resort to violence in the wake of an Indo-Fijian victory in the elections, and 
believed they had explosives, firearms and a strong centralised leadership (Rabuka, 
2000: 9). He later presented an argument that pandered to the indigenous movement 
by ascribing the coup as necessary to preventing the ‘erosion of Fijian land and other 
rights by an “Indian dominated” government’ (Lal, 1988: 10) and sought justification 
by arguing that the election of the Bavadra government involved a weakness of 
indigenous Fijian solidarity that reflected a breakdown of Fijian society and culture, 
making himself the protector of traditional values (Durutalo, 2000: 77-78; Baba, 
2005: 368). Rabuka is the central figure of the 1987 coup, and his position is one that 
is mirrored in later political unrest. 
 
The Taukei movement is an indigenous Fijian support group with militant overtures 
who sought the guarantee of political control to safeguard indigenous Fijian interests 
(Watson, 2005b: 360). An assortment of differing groups of Fijian individuals and 
institutions, it was unofficially formed in 1987 as a ‘vehicle of all indigenous Fijians 
irrespective of their political affiliation’ (Lal, 1988: 72; Field et al, 2005: 38). They 
primarily challenged the 1987 election results based on the assumption that 
indigenous Fijian’s should rule, but the election results outright opposed these beliefs 
(Lal, 1988: 11, 97). There has been some evidence that suggests the Taukei’s support 
network was actually fading and that Rabuka was simply acting as an extension of 
their will rather than preventing violence (Lawson, 1991: 257, 259). It is also possible 
that their resistance to change was also fuelled by the potential power-shift from the 
traditional Eastern provinces towards Bavadra’s home Western provinces (Field et al, 
2005: 37, 38). This dichotomy of resistance is important in understanding the 
temporary unity of the indigenous movement. 
 
There are several parties involved in the 1987 coup that can be discussed in less 
detail, as their roles were less prominent. The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) is the 
oldest indigenous ruling body. Created in 1874 it formed the cornerstone of Fijian 
administration during the colonial era (Lal, 1988: 20). Uniquely Fijian, it is a non-
political body that advises the government on Fijian matters, and retains an advisory 
role (Baba, 2005: 366). While they encouraged the development of a system of 
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government that would be acceptable to more parties, attempting to coerce a peaceful 
resolution (Rabuka, 2000: 12), they also publicly backed Rabuka and his actions, 
endorsing a belief that the coup was both legal and a credible means of imposing 
political change.  
 
The framework has thus directly introduced the two main parties in the coup, Rabuka 
and the Taukei movement as separate entities. This is an important component of this 
category in the framework as each had different motivations, goals and the capacity to 
undertake their objectives. Comparing their roles in this coup with those involved in 
the later conflict is very important in the Fijian case study, as this category has the 
biggest change in the later transitional phase. 
 
6.3b Governance 
 
Fiji is a Westminster style democracy with a Prime Minister, a system introduced by 
the colonial administrators prior to independence in 1970. This period’s elections 
were marked by intense fractious race-based political alliances, between which the 
ruling elites battled for control (Watson, 2005b: 359). The 1987 win by the Labour 
Coalition was notable for another reason, as both major parties claimed to be backed 
by large numbers of constituents from multiple ethnic groups (Lal, 1988: 38) it 
signified a challenge to the constitutions assumptions that there was a ‘right’ for 
indigenous Fijians to lead. A constitutional review was driven by Rabuka, 
culminating in the 1990 constitution but this was criticised by the international 
community (Rabuka, 2000: 12). The review attempted to enshrine some of the Taukei 
movement’s proposals, with the aim of recognising the paramountcy of indigenous 
Fijians and rejecting the concept of equal constitutional rights (Lal, 1988: 101). This 
constitution was widely denounced as marginalizing the Indo-Fijian community and 
disregarding universal human rights, with negative implications for the overall feeling 
of equality (Lal, 2000a: 21).  
 
By utilising the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework, the system of government 
and the problems of carrying out state functions against a strong national identity in 
Fiji are distinguished, illuminating the constitutional issues that developed. The 
governance category has thus highlighted some of the necessary aspects of Fijian 
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government and functions of state. This is important as the majority of Fijian conflict 
relates to political antipathy and influence of the states enforcement body. 
 
6.3c Structural 
 
As the coup was predominantly restricted to the political elites without widespread 
civil violence, the institutions of state remained physically intact. However, the coup 
did demonstrate that with tension and internal crisis the apolitical institutions of state 
cease to function (Baba, 2005: 365). These coups marked the beginning of an exodus 
from a state in which the dominant indigenous Fijian ethnic group perceived the Indo-
Fijians as visitors or guests, reinforced by law (Lal, 1988: 125). It effectively created 
a situation in which one identity group could not see any means to gain parity, and 
reinforced the pre-existing massive sectoral imbalance.  
 
The military is of vital importance in understanding Fijian politics. A part of the 
structure of state, the military came to be an actor in its own right during the 1987 
crisis. Rabuka had openly stated his belief that the military would ‘have a public role 
in Fiji for the next 15-20 years’. This combined with the heightened suspicion around 
the prospect of a labour party led review, reinforced Rabuka’s belief that the military 
had to be used before it was reformed beyond his control (Lal, 1988: 57). The use of 
the military in seizing control and establishing a new government unlocked the 
prospects for future military intervention in Fijian politics, and changed their role 
from passive servant to equal partner.   
 
While the second largest ethnic group was unable to gain long-term political polarity, 
the entire state structure was biased, and this is clearly illustrated by this section of the 
framework. The dominance of the military by indigenous Fijians and that ethnic 
groups desire to be deeply involved in politics reinforces the need to study the balance 
of differing ethnic groups within the structural category. 
 
6.3d Resolution 
 
The two coups in 1987 were effectively resolved by the complete domination by 
Rabuka and his supporters over all their political rivals. There was no overwhelming 
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response to the coup, so the changes imposed by Rabuka formed an end to the 
conflict. However, there was still a sentiment of racial discord between the indigenous 
and Indo-Fijian populations, as this had persisted over a much longer period of time, 
and would not be ended merely by a political coup (Lal, 1988: 59). The lack of firm 
resolution kept these tensions and inter-ethnic suspicions active. Strikingly, the main 
issue unresolved by the coups was that of ethnic representation and subsequently the 
1990 constitution failed to deliver a suitable electoral system that could resolve that 
ethnic imbalance.  
 
6.4 Transformative Process 
 
The transitional period between the end of the 1987 conflict and the developing coup 
in 2000 was marked by several significant elements. There were major changes in the 
population demographics with significant numbers of Indo-Fijians emigrating, 
increasing the ethnic majority of the indigenous Fijians and exacerbating the ethnic 
imbalance (Watson, 2005b: 360). There were also devastating economic losses during 
this period, with a 33% devaluation of the Fijian dollar (Field et al, 2005: 43). This 
period also saw the rise of the Soqosoqo ni Vkavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) party, with 
it’s leader Rabuka being elected Prime Minister in 1992. The political flux brought on 
by the 1990 constitution resulted in a review and rewrite five years later. When 
completed, the new constitution entrenched the ethnic divisions by creating a 
proportional representation system, but produced a landslide victory for Mahendra 
Chaudhry’s Indo-Fijian coalition in 1999 (Watson, 2005b: 361). It was this victory 
that led to the 2000 coup and the end of the transition period. Use of the Comparative 
Peacebuilding Framework here illustrates that the most significant changes are 
negative, with few positives. Dramatic ethnic imbalance and biased constitutional 
reviews escalated the potential for civil violence, culminating in the 2000 coup. 
 
6.4a Involvement 
 
There is effectively only one main group operating during the transitional period, 
Rabuka’s SVT party. The dominant SVT party was consolidated around the same 
premise of indigenous Fijian dominance, as had been the political environment prior 
to the 1987 election, while Chaudhry’s rival alliance was predicated on the concept of 
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a multi-ethnic conglomeration. Despite their presence, neither party were major actors 
in the transitional phase, with only Rabuka’s party obtaining any real power. The 
importance in recognising these parties lies in establishing their places prior to the 
1999 elections and the 2000 coup as rivals. The lack of clear rivals to the military 
backed SVT party is clear during this period, while their motivations mirrored those 
of the earlier political period. This involvement category thus highlights the fact that 
only one party was truly involved in the transitional process, providing a dangerous 
comparison to other periods. With only one party having power, ensuring balance and 
equality was far more difficult and resulted in an exacerbation of the power 
imbalance.  
 
6.4b Governance 
 
The 1990 constitution had institutionalised an undemocratic and racially biased 
system that served to encourage Fiji’s isolation from the international community 
(Watson, 2005b: 360). A 1995 constitutional review led to a rewrite in 1997 that 
reversed the discriminatory changes and saw the adoption of a preferential voting 
system designed to encourage cooperation between the two dominant political bodies 
(Lal, 2000a: 23; Fraenkel, 2006: 86). This incorporated a mandatory provision that 
any party gaining over 10% of the seats in parliament would be entitled to at least one 
seat in cabinet, enabling powerful coalitions such as Chaudhry’s alliance to be more 
flexible with their power sharing (Lal, 2000a: 23). The ‘Reeves Commission’ review 
also encouraged a split parliament with 45 open seats and 25 ethnically reserved seats, 
but intervention by Rabuka’s Select Committee reversed the allocation, resulting in 
dominance of parliamentary seats by specific ethnic allegiance (Norton, 2000: 54-55). 
This entire process was fraught with difficulty given the desire of indigenous Fijians 
to guarantee their position of dominance (Fraenkel, 2006: 90-91).  
 
This category of the framework highlights the weakness of an undemocratic 
government in establishing long-term peace - the adoption of an altered voting system 
was undertaken without sufficient input from the political opposition. It also further 
signifies a consolidation of politics into ethnic-based political identities with severe 
consequences in later periods. The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework allows the 
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constitutional and political changes that took place to be examined in context with the 
previous political structure.  
 
6.4c Reconstruction 
 
After having noted how easy it was to supplant the government with only a small 
number of armed forces, Rabuka created a counter terrorist arm based on the British 
Special Air Services (Field et al, 2005: 93). Entirely comprised of indigenous Fijians, 
the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU) was highly trained to prevent 
armed resistance to the government. This was the only agency to be restructured with 
the military, police and other state institutions remaining predominantly the same. 
Markedly, there was no attempt to reconstruct or alter the societies structural 
imbalance, either by the state services, GCC or their associated land boards, and many 
aspects continued to support ethno-nationalism (Baba, 2005: 366).  
 
This category highlights a lack of physical damage during the initial conflict and thus 
focuses on the redevelopments of the state structure. Because the CRWU was a 
development within the police, this is a change to the states structure, indicating a 
conscious attempt to strengthen the states ability to resist coercion. This is notably 
different from the insertion of another party to the conflict, and is thus important in 
the framework as it allows a comparison of how the state structure was unable to 
prevent civil conflict. 
  
6.4d Reconciliation 
 
While the rewrite of the constitution indicated some political reconciliation, there was 
no wide spread attempts to reconcile the parties following the 1987 coup. The ethnic 
cleavages remained pertinent, and the development of the counter terrorist unit 
actually increased the number of armed factions. The emigration of large numbers of 
Indo-Fijians and the relocation of their businesses during this transition period 
destroyed a substantial number of job opportunities and employment in the private 
sector, which served to further increase animosity between the two ethnic groups 
(Naidu, 2005: 373).  
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This category suggests few attempts to reduce the overall hostility during this period. 
Use of the framework here allows this failure of societal reconciliation to be seen in 
its full scope, as it can be compared directly with the problems left unresolved in the 
prior conflict, and how they contributed to the causes of strife later on.  
 
6.5 Conflict Event 
 
 The Labour led Coalition government resoundingly defeated the indigenous Fijian 
SVT party in the 1999 election, rejecting Rabuka and his supporters (Field et al, 2000: 
54-55). The subsequent year of negative press about the government generated a 
feeling that a coup was unstoppable. Police cancelled protest march applications days 
before the coup, while military forces increased their training preparation (Field et al, 
2005: 70-71). The coup then took place on 19 May 2000 exactly one year after 
Chaudhry and his government had taken power (Watson, 2005b: 361) with George 
Speight leading an attempt by the elite Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit to 
reassert indigenous Fijian control (Naidu, 2005: 372).  
 
This ‘Speight Group’ held the government hostage at gunpoint for 56 days, 
demanding governmental reform while the Fijian military laid siege outside (Watson, 
2005b: 361; Fraenkel, 2006: 74). Outside the parliament compound increasing civil 
violence and violent suppression of the media resulted in several murders, escalating 
the situation beyond that of the 1987 coup (Field et al, 2005: 127-128, 133-134). This 
violence led to martial law and the blockade of Suva by the military as Defence Force 
head Commodore Bainimarama called up the army reservists (Field et al, 2005: 135, 
137). 
 
Despite negotiations and a later peace accord, rising frustrations led to Bainimarama 
increasing his resistance to the rebels that resulted in a violent exchange with dozens 
wounded by gunshots (Watson, 2005b: 362). This culminated with the swearing in of 
a new civilian government with former senator Laisenia Qarase as Prime Minister 
(Field, 2007: 178; Field et al, 2005: 205). Ironically, while Bainimarama’s actions had 
the trappings of a counter-coup, he did not restore the ousted Chaudhry to power, 
creating uncertainty in his motivations and spurring Speights supporters to higher 
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levels of violence8 (Field, 2007: 178; Field et al, 2005: 205-206, 234). By November 
the chaos had escalated into a failed mutiny within the army (Field et al, 2005: 243), 
and while Bainimarama managed to narrowly escape an assassination attempt, eight 
soldiers were killed and dozens wounded, with five mutinous soldiers later found 
tortured to death by Bainimarama’s troops (Field et al, 2005: 244). The repression of 
the mutiny and acceptance of Qarase’s government signals the end of this coup 
phase9. 
 
6.5a Involvement 
 
The coup’s front man was George Speight, a businessman formerly from the timber 
industry. Speight echoed Rabuka’s earlier sentiments of traditional values being lost 
in the modern era and claimed to act out of concern for indigenous Fijian interests 
(Baba, 2005:  368; Watson, 2005b: 361). The group was reportedly disorganised but 
citizen support helped establish a strong enough foundation to survive any swift 
conflict with police or military forces (Field et al, 2005: 83, 85). His motivations were 
very evident, and it was his extreme willingness to act as the figurehead for a range of 
nationalist groups that enabled the success of the initial coup. 
 
The military was a strong component of this coup, as individuals from the Counter 
Revolutionary Warfare Unit broke rank and assisted Speight in overthrowing the 
government. How Speight managed to involve the CRWU is still unclear, but their 
retired founder pointed out his bias when stating “getting rid of the government was 
something that almost every Fijian was talking about at the time…I did not hesitate – 
I believe in protecting the institution of the Taukei first before protecting the 
institution of the government” (Field et al, 2005: 77). It was this underlying 
nationalist sentiment that helped subvert the CRWU, and when coupled with the same 
growing ground level discontent that marked the 1987 coup, provided the 
                                                 
8
 It can be argued that Bainamarama’s actions were definitely a coup, and he should have been 
reprimanded in the coups aftermath. The failure to do so illustrated that the military was an equal 
political actor. 
9
 Ironically, the rise of the military to end this coup created the roots for a coup in 2006. Bainimarama 
threatened a coup for several months after dissatisfactory election results, and overturned the 
government, replacing it with a military junta. A systematic clean-up of the state sector was to remove 
corruption and correct historic problems, but has resulted in an elimination of democracy and an 
instalment of military officers at most levels of government.   
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fundamentals for the 2000 coup. While Bainimarama was head of the military at this 
point, his role in the coup was small, acting as a catalyst to end the violence once it 
had occurred. The actual role of the military in beginning the conflict lay entirely with 
the CRWU. 
 
The election of Mahendra Chaudhry as Prime Minister in 1999 was a historic 
moment, given his Indo-Fijian background (Rabuka, 2000: 18). He was seen as a 
divisive politican that pushed land tenure reforms and was accused by the GCC of 
being disrespectful of traditional Fijian institutions (Watson, 2005b: 361; Field et al, 
2005: 67). His selection to lead the new parliament angered many indigenous Fijians, 
as they saw this as further power consolidation by the ethnic minority (Pareti and 
Fraenkel, 2007: 91).  
 
The growth of digital media played a small role in the 2000 coup. Extensive scandal 
mongering and other attempts to discredit the government by the news media after the 
1999 election helped to create an environment where the government was seen as 
weak and corrupt (Field, 2007: 177). The larger use of digital and television media 
since 1987 allowed the Taukei movement to promote their nationalistic agenda more 
effectively. Several protest marches and increasing threats were held with greater 
publicity, allowing the organisation to get a similar impact to that obtained in 1987 
(Field et al, 2005: 68-69).  
 
This category of the model quickly shows how many parties were involved in the 
second coup. While Speight attempted to mirror Rabuka as a strong individual leader, 
the Taukei movement was far more involved and aggressive than previously, 
illustrating a heightened scenario. Mahendra Chaudhry was seen as more divisive than 
previous Indo-Fijian leaders, and his election victory echoed that of 1987 but the 
repeat meant larger ramifications. Meanwhile, new media capability intensified the 
situation with a wider audience able to hear, form opinions and respond to the 
ongoing events. This is clearly highlighted by the key differences between the two 
conflict involvement categories.  
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6.5b Governance 
 
In an attempt to subdue the rebel’s aggression, the military abrogated the 1997 
constitution, restoring the previous post-coup 1990 constitution10 (Fraenkel, 2006: 
87). Despite the 1997 constitution being created and ratified by the indigenous Fijian 
dominated government, those responsible for the 2000 coup denounced it, ignoring 
the attempted reconciliation it tried to introduce (Lal, 2000b: 175). Under the 1997 
constitution the mixed-ethnicity government was legitimately elected, but their 
leadership by an Indo-Fijian lost them a level of support by those parties most likely 
to act. When combined with the negative media attention, the government’s ability to 
reduce coup opportunities led to the same situation that existed in 1987. When 
compared with the previous governance period, the widespread street violence 
temporarily prevented economic benefits to Fiji, but little changed in regards to state 
governance. 
 
This category relates to the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework by highlighting 
the removal of the 1997 constitution. This can then be compared with the earlier 
governance category, as political control of the state continues to be highly 
contentious. Within the framework this category is important as it reflects the 
importance of the political conflict within Fiji during this turbulent period. 
 
6.5c Structural 
 
Despite the coup being carried out by members of the military, it was predominantly 
civil in character, in contrast to the 1987 Rabuka coup. The military’s duality due to 
the CRWU’s actions and the opposing military forces headed by loyalist 
Bainimarama, led to confusion over its legitimisation (Watson, 2005b: 361). 
Bainimarama was forced to act and declare martial law when Chaudhry was assaulted 
and militants raided the central Fijian television station (Watson, 2005b: 362). The 
attempted mutiny indicated that the legitimisation of the military was a serious factor 
in the 2000 coup and was a severe weakness for future stability. 
 
                                                 
10
 While they discarded the 1997 Constitution, this was restored in 2001 once the coup was over. 
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The coup was also responsible for destroying the historical reputation of 
professionalism that the military had earned over time. This created an image of a 
divided military dominated by regionalism, with a distinct possibility of splitting the 
military into individual tribal allegiances (Lal, 2000b: 176-177). The military’s 
different roles in both coups are key to understanding the structural differences 
between these periods. In this conflict event the military and police were unable to 
curtail extensive mob rule as they were disrupted by internal politics until 
Bainimarama was able to secure overall control. In contrast the 1987 coup was 
marked by strong central command (Lal, 2000b: 180). This also differed from the 
earlier coup in that extensive violence was pre-empted by Rabuka’s actions with swift 
control preventing significant damage. Thus, while the military is indicative of an 
organ of state, its roles in the respective coups differ dramatically and are clearly 
highlighted by the model’s comparative category analysis.  
 
6.5d Causes of Strife 
 
The central issues of the 2000 coup were very similar to those that were the basis of 
the 1987 coup. The same ethnic divisions and military influences on the political 
process continue to cause severe electoral complications in Fiji. The base frustration 
of ethnicity and identity within a closed environment has perpetuated the perception 
of sectoral imbalance, creating a homogenous and dangerous political mix. 
Exacerbated by media attention and the victory of Chaudhry’s coalition, the same 
core issues have remained unresolved. The wider societal implications of refusing to 
accept non-indigenous political control has continued to harm Fiji’s economy and 
sectoral balance, and until the role of the armed forces is resolved Fijian politics will 
continue to be unstable. 
 
This section of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework is important as it reveals 
the most significant cause of the 2000 coup. Ethnic divisions and frustration continue 
to promote conflict within Fiji, and the lack of comparative reconciliation undertaken 
earlier has not resolved the problem.  
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6.6 Analysis of Success or Failure 
 
The transitional phase was successful in implementing a new constitution that equated 
political representation to similar numbers in the balance of Fiji’s population. 
However, this measure failed due to the lack of widespread acceptance of non-
indigenous roles developed in this transition. This indicated that the peacebuilding 
period might have been too brief to encourage the system-wide change that was likely 
necessary for long-term peace. While Rabuka’s party remained in control until the 
1999 election, they failed to successfully find a political balance that could introduce 
balanced legislation acceptable to the pro-nationalist movements.  
 
The involvement of the military was paramount in both periods of the coup. The main 
problem with the transitional reconstruction phase was its failure to address the 
involvement of the armed forces. Rabuka’s personal attachment to the military made 
it difficult to adjust to this situation. When the military is involved in civilian affairs, 
few positives emerge, and this situation can often have dangerous implications. As 
Lal suggests, “Governments installed at gunpoint have nowhere been able to bring 
peace and stability; violence begets more violence” (1988: 124). Once military forces 
are released from their barracks and introduced as a political figure, they are seldom 
returned to their traditional roles.  
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework highlights that underlying ethnic tensions 
were never resolved, as this issue remains consistent through all phases of the 
conflict. Armed forces remained actors through both coup phases and the inability of 
the transition phase to reduce the likelihood of armed involvement in Fijian politics 
illustrates a failure of the peacebuilding process. Slow political acceptance of the 
multi-ethnic situation in Fiji coupled with significant changes to the political-military 
relationship would appear to be the only way to prevent future conflict. 
 
6.7 Framework Analysis 
 
The findings highlighted by use of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework can be 
loosely compiled into a simple layout, as shown in Figure 8. This shows some of the 
key similarities such as the importance of a single leadership figure backed by the 
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same nationalist support network, and that the constitution and political representation 
were the main conflict flash points. The similarity of many of the categories in both 
periods indicates that the peacebuilding process was not successful. Some aspects did 
change, as seen with the role of the military changing, but that could be ascribed to 
the strength and decision-making of individual leaders. Probably the most important 
change shown in the framework is the involvement of ‘new’ media sources, combined 
with a decline of traditional leadership amongst young protestors. An increased ability 
to spread a message of resistance without complying to respected elders resulted in a 
higher degree of violence in the 2000 coup. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
Application of the Framework – Solomon Islands 
 
7.1 Solomon Islands Introduction 
 
As a small chain of islands lying to the northeast of Australia, the Solomon Islands 
conflict has been studied at great length despite the relatively small size of the 
conflict. The Solomon Islands have been wrought with government corruption and 
traditional patronage that had become endemic and expected by the national 
governance. The country is new to independence, and subsequently lacks a sense of 
national identity, and its inexperience with western democracy has created political 
instability within the region. This instability translated into heightened ethnic tensions 
and a weakened state’s financial ability to keep up with tension-related compensation. 
This led directly to a breakout of civil war in 1998 that serves as the Prior Conflict in 
the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework. The two primary ethnic groups became 
rallying points for many of the underlying issues, and with a series of violent 
incidents and a widespread breakdown in law and order, only a foreign intervention in 
2003 was able to separate the factions and serve as the beginning of the Transition 
phase.  
 
The regional assistance force utilised a combination of police and military to isolate 
and disarm the rebel forces and reinstate a system of government while 
simultaneously attempting to restore judicial processes and state functions. While 
successful at isolating the warring groups, the social and physical reconstruction was 
unable to prevent an outbreak of violence in 2006 following contentious electoral 
results. This Conflict Event erupted against the Chinese business district targeting 
Chinese owned shops in the center of Honiara that represented an increasing financial 
dominance by foreigners. Violence is thus a constant threat in the Solomon Islands, 
but the lack of fatalities in the 2006 riots showed that positive developments have 
emerged from the peacebuilding phase. Given that over 200 people were killed and 
35,000 people displaced in the earlier conflict, the recent riots are clearly very 
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different (Hameiri, 2007: 410). The conflicts in the Solomon Islands are a clear 
example of a situation with a massive breakdown in law and order, institutionalised 
corruption, failure of state services and vast population displacement (McDougal, 
2004: 214). The states compensation based patronage system was untenable and as 
the capacity of the state diminished, the level of dissatisfaction with the government 
increased leading to aggression and future violence.  
 
7.2 Background 
 
The Solomon Islands are a chain of over 900 islands spread over 1.6 million square 
kilometres of ocean (Mortlock, 2006: 109). A national identity was only introduced 
with the period of British colonial rule beginning in 1893, however each islands 
unique identity often overruled individual allegiances (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 
415; McDougall, 2004: 215; Amnesty International, 2000: 2). This colonial period 
was marked by an influx of foreign administrative specialists, preventing the rise of 
an indigenous elite class (McDougall, 2004: 215). Following the Second World War, 
a capital was established at Honiara on Guadalcanal to take advantage of the 
infrastructure developed for the Henderson airbase. This took advantage of the large 
infrastructure the allies had built during the war and the greater rural landarea of 
Guadalcanal (Watson, 2005c: 401). A significant population shift occurred, with huge 
numbers moving from the islands of Malaita to Guadalcanal, increasing the 
population from only 195,000 people in 1978 to 450,000 by 2000 (Amnesty 
International, 2000: 2; Romer and Renzaho, 2007: 4; McDougall, 2004: 215, 216). 
The indigenous Guadalcanalese resented the loss of land to the incoming Malaitans, 
as they sought to start new lives upon purchased or squatted on land (Mortlock, 2006: 
110). This tension underlined future relationships between these two largest ethnic 
groups. With nearly 90 different indigenous languages across the relatively small 
population, the development of a national identity has been difficult, and this has 
reinforced the local loyalties of the individual members of government (Reilly, 2004: 
488). With additional problems such as a very youthful population (50% under the 
age of 15), high urban unemployment, comparatively low levels of economic 
development, and a high reliance on subsistence agriculture and fishing, the Solomon 
Islands have a vast array of potential causes for civil conflict (Morgan and McLeod, 
2006: 415; Hameiri, 2007: 420; Watson, 2005c: 402). 
Page 99 
 
7.3 Prior Conflict 
 
By 1998 the Solomon Islands had developed a political system based on the principle 
of patronage. Politicians were consumed by a desire to retain and pass on benefits to 
their own constituents, making it impossible for the government to plan for long term 
development with centrally administered parties continually fared poorly in 
elections11 (Mortlock, 2006: 114; Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 416). These years of 
successively poor policies and the subsequent weak leadership led directly to the 
conflict. The endemic corruption engendered a requirement for patronage amongst 
succeeding politicians, and once this requirement was unable to be fulfilled by the 
fading economy, problems arose (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 416). Effectively, the 
Solomon Islands state had become a vehicle for demanding ‘largesse’ that bled the 
economy dry (Watson, 2005c: 401).  
 
In 1998 the rising tensions between the two main ethnic groups in Honiara escalated 
into a violent conflict that rapidly spread throughout the Solomon Islands (Amnesty 
International, 2000: 2). The most notable issue of this tension was the long-standing 
claims for compensation by the Guadalcanalese over the loss of land to migrating 
Malaitans during the development of Honiara on Guadalcanal (Amnesty International, 
2000: 5; Mortlock, 2006: 112). By October, numerous armed groups of youths began 
a campaign of intimidation, threats and violent assaults under the umbrella title of the 
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)12, targeting the Malaitan settlers and their 
descendents on Guadalcanal island (Amnesty International, 2000: 2; Kabutaulaka, 
2005b: 413; Fraenkel, 2004: 44). The police force was overwhelmed, and were only 
able to secure Honiara, which become a safe enclave for Malaitan refugee’s, while the 
Guadalcanalese shifted further into the rural regions, allowing the IFM to bolster its 
support network (Amnesty International, 2000: 3; Watson, 2005c: 403). In early 1999 
the expected response from the Malaitans within Honiara occurred as many took up 
arms and formed the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF). Their close ties to the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police Service (RSIPS) gave them access to police weapons and 
                                                 
11
 It was not unusual for half of the sitting members of parliament to lose their seats during a general 
election, most notably occurring in 1997, just prior to the conflict (McDougall, 2004: 215). 
12
 This group underwent several name changes before settling on the IFM, with the first iteration being 
known as the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA). 
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influence and allowed direct lobbying of the government for compensation to the 
Malaitan populace for the damage done by the IFM (Amnesty International, 2000: 4, 
6; Fraenkel, 2004: 68). The MEF began resisting the IFM, beginning a sweeping 
conflict that completely destabilised the Solomon Islands.  
 
By 1999 international powers responded with a small and inadequate force from Fiji 
and Vanuatu to observe a temporary peace process (Amnesty International, 2000: 10; 
Fraenkel, 2004: 73). This was unsuccessful, and when an MEF coup in June 2000 
removed Prime Minister Ulufa’ulu from power, the conflict intensified, paralysing the 
government and state sector and forcing the observers to leave (Amnesty 
International, 2000: 11; Mortlock, 2006: 114). Further peace attempts merely 
curtailed the worst excesses of violence and allowed elections in December 200113, 
but the endemic corruption and intimidation continued (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 286; 
McDougall, 2004: 216).  
 
By 2003 the changing international political environment14 encouraged Australian 
intervention at the request of the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, resulting in the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Wallis, 2006: 81). This 
was composed primarily of police and military forces from Australia and New 
Zealand who had been reluctant to become involved before 2003 due to the violent 
civil war (Fraenkel, 2004: 83; Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 283). RAMSI was able to separate 
the warring parties, providing an end to the Prior Conflict and introduces the 
beginning of the organised peacebuilding transition phase.  
 
7.3a Involvement 
 
There are two main identity groups in this conflict - the Guadacanalese and Malaitans. 
Without a strong national identity forged through an independence struggle, cultural 
divergences between the dominant identity groups led to a situation where they 
                                                 
13
 Sir Allan Kemakeza was elected as Prime Minister in 2001, but earlier accusations of improper use 
of compensation payments made it very difficult for the government to gain a moral high ground and 
reverse the overall corruption (McDougall, 2004: 216-217). 
14
 Following the post-September 11th 2001 attacks on New York, the international political 
environment became more focused on prevention of states failing and becoming safe havens for 
international terrorists (Mortlock, 2006: 117; Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 289). 
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clearly perceived themselves as being very different and separate, yet contested the 
same set of national resources (Hameiri, 2007: 422).  
 
The Guadalcanalese people were known to resent the large migration of Malaitans 
during the establishment of the capital, and had demanded compensation for the loss 
of local land and employment opportunities (McDougall, 2004: 215). Historic 
compensation claims made by Malaitan’s had been successful in 1989 and 1996, 
where the government paid compensation rather than demand recompense from the 
‘offenders’ (Fraenkel, 2004: 48). When recent demands for compensation failed a 
group of Guadalcanalese formed the IFM and began attacking Malaitans in rural 
areas, resulting in massive population displacement (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 284; 
McDougall, 2004: 215; Reilly, 2004: 489). By late 1999 over 35,000 people had been 
displaced, with about 70% leaving rural Guadalcanal (Fraenkel, 2004: 55). The 
involvement of the IFM was principally responsible for the conflict as they converted 
the underlying hostility and the failure of compensatory politics into outright violence. 
 
Formed as a response to the IFM, the MEF represented an armed resistance that 
aimed to both protect Malaitans and gain a position of strength for conflict reparations 
(McDougall, 2004: 215). Their close ties to the Solomon Islands Police Service 
allowed them access to superior firearms and the ability to evade some state 
restrictions such as roadblocks (Amnesty International, 2000: 4). Their response and 
armed resistance placed tremendous pressure on the government, and when their 
demands for the government to compensate damage inflicted by the IFM failed, they 
deposed the Prime Minister in a bloodless coup (Amnesty International, 2000: 6; 
Fraenkel, 2004: 68). By responding in a similarly militant manner to the IFM, the 
MEF were responsible for heightening the conflict.  
 
The use of the framework here illustrates these two main identity groups and outlines 
their basic goals as being incompatible. The consistency of each party is important as 
the parties involved at later stages vary from this early stage. Thus, the MEF and IFM 
have been analysed and described at length to allow a full comparison with the later 
periods. 
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7.3b Governance 
 
The principle failing of governance in the Solomon Islands conflict was the states’ 
decreasing ability to satisfy the patronage techniques utilised for over a decade. As the 
conflict continued, the toll on both domestic earnings and foreign debt began to 
severely harm the capability of the government to carry out basic state functions. 
Figure 9 illustrates that once the two groups began to fight, the government suffered a 
massive revenues loss and a stifling inability to pay its bills. The impact of the 
conflict on the economy was significant, with a decline of 60% in exports between 
1996 and 2001, while the GDP per capita had halved since the Solomon Islands 
independence (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 293). 
 
Government Accounts 1997 – 2002 (S$ million) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
External Debt 756.0 827.7 833.8 851.7 980.8 1,291.1 
Financial Reserves 145.9 233.7 255.1 156.1 102.6 129.9 
Revenue - Expenditure -66.7 192.8 69.3 -237.0 -87.5 -309.1 
Balance of Payments 33.9 83.0 23.0 -97.2 -57.2 57.4 
 
(Figure 9: Solomon Islands Government Accounts (Fraenkel, 2004: 148-149)) 
 
As the regions’ economy failed, the overarching system of patronage collapsed, 
causing distress amongst those communities and individuals attuned to this political 
process (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 417). The government then became unstable 
when the Prime Minister, Ulufa’alu refused to pay compensation to either the 
indigenous Guadacanal or displaced Malaitans during the conflict (Kabutaulaka, 
2005a: 286). His refusal primarily stemmed from the sheer size of the compensation 
claims and the declining budget that had resulted from the collapse of the private 
sector (Fraenkel, 2004: 122). Taken hostage and forced to resign at gunpoint by the 
MEF in June 2000, the Prime Minister was replaced by Manasseh Sogavare in an 
illegitimate vote that was not recognised by several parties (McDougall, 2004: 215). 
This lack of recognition resulted in a disruption to public services and many of the 
systems of law and order began to collapse (Mortlock, 2006: 110-111).  
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A part of successful governance is the concept of a national identity that allows a state 
to function as one common body. The Solomon Islands lacked a cohesive identity, 
with allegiances to individual communities and tribes often seen as more relevant than 
a national government (Reilly, 2004: 482). This is specifically problematic for 
decision makers as it implies that politicians and public servants tend towards gains 
for specific groups rather than developing wider social policies (Hameiri, 2007: 423). 
Elections thus vary wildly, as voters do not tend towards larger national or even 
regional parties, and instead cast votes according to kinship and personal debts 
(Fraenkel, 2004: 135). Within the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework the 
problems of the weak Solomon Islands national identity and internal fragmentation 
are clearly highlighted. This governance category also provides a description of the 
main problems with the Solomon Islands government allowing comparison with the 
post-peacebuilding period to find any significant changes that had occurred. 
 
7.3c Structural 
 
The population dynamics of the Solomon Islands changed significantly during the 
conflict, with large-scale evictions of Malaitans from settlements on Guadalcanal, 
closure of major industries and a population shift with Guadalcanalese returning to 
rural villages in large numbers (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 285). This developed a 
population structure that reinforced a dominance of Malaitans in the central 
infrastructure while Guadalcanalese influence became largely restricted to rural 
regions.  
 
The Royal Solomon Islands Police Service (RSIPS) was important during this conflict 
as the Solomon Islands had no military and the role of preventing widespread conflict 
lay entirely with the police service. However, large numbers of the small police 
service were ethnically Malaitans, leading to a severe perception that the police force 
was biased15. The police service was undermanned and underarmed, and was forced 
to retreat and protect only the capital rather than attempting to also contain the 
violence in the rural regions. Finally, the RSIPS revealed a level of bias when some of 
                                                 
15
 This was reinforced by anecdotal reports that members of the MEF were passing through police 
check points with ease, and at times undertook joint operations against the IFM. 
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its members assisted in the 2000 coup. During this coup some members of the police 
service seized control of the central police armoury and naval vessels in Honiara and 
placed the Prime Minister under house arrest (Fraenkel, 2004: 87).  
 
This category indicates that the conflict caused massive structural changes, with a 
population shift isolating the main identity groups. Bias and corruption in the police 
service rendered the law enforcement components of the state inert, and were unable 
to act as a broader peace enforcement unit and judicial body. Comparing this with the 
same category after the peacebuilding phase allows an analysis of the changes made 
to address these issues. 
 
7.3d Resolution 
 
The introduction of a regional mission to bring peace to the Solomon Islands and 
strengthen the failing state was a highly successful resolution in regards to separation 
of armed forces (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 283). Over 2,000 military and police personnel 
were deployed in a massive show of strength that was disproportionately large 
compared to the forces needed, coercing the militants to back down without a 
protracted fight (Fraenkel, 2004: 159). This tactic was very successful and prevented 
guerrilla resistance or gang fighting from undermining the immediate peace process. 
The introduction of RAMSI was also broader than most truce agreements, in that new 
authority was granted to the intervention force to assist in economic and judicial 
developments.  
 
This fits into the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework by reinforcing the superior 
strength of the resolution and the intervention force. The implications of this positive 
resolution is seen throughout the Transformative Process, as RAMSI was able to 
influence all stages of the peacebuilding effort, while ramifications of their influence 
are seen in the later 2006 riots. 
 
7.4 Transformative Process 
 
The end of the violence in 2003 can be attributed to the intervention by armed 
RAMSI police and military forces. This intervention was largely inspired by the 2003 
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Australian Strategic Policy Institution (ASPI) report ‘Our Failing Neighbour’ that 
indicated that a failed Solomon Islands could become a ‘petri dish’ for non-state 
security threats, with dangerous implications for Australian security (ASPI, 2003: 13). 
The decision to intervene came three years after the coup had ousted Ulufa’alu from 
power and the signing of the Biketawa declaration that had facilitated security 
cooperation amongst Pacific Island states, granting a legal justification for 
intervention16 (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 284). RAMSI was undertaken under Operation 
Helpem Fren (literally ‘Helping a Friend’ in pidgin english) as a regional intervention 
led by Australia, but with participation from several Pacific nations (Morgan and 
McLeod, 2006: 418). Primarily a police mission reinforced by the military where 
necessary, RAMSI was designed to work alongside and bolster existing internal state 
services, separate the conflicting parties and over time consolidate good governance 
practices through the state sector while reforming the economy (Morgan and McLeod, 
2006: 419; Wallis, 2006: 82). This intervention succeeded beyond expectations for 
several years, and consequently RAMSI developed a ‘golden halo’ reputation. During 
this period the police were reinforced, large numbers of firearms were disarmed and 
the combatants were demobilised. However, the government was not restructured and 
the same practices of patronage and corruption continued unabated. By 2006, 
dissatisfactory electoral results ended with the unpopular Sogavare being elected 
Prime Minister in what appeared to be back-room politics, leading directly to 
widespread riots and the end of the successful transitional phase. 
 
7.4a Involvement 
 
Australia was far more interested in getting involved in the transition period than they 
had been in prior years. The changing international security environment altered the 
disposition of Australia towards the Solomons and encouraged them to act 
(McDougall, 2004: 214). The ASPI report provided the motivation, explanation and 
methodology underpinning the intervention (McDougall, 2004: 217-218). The 2003 
intervention represented a dramatic shift from their earlier position, within which 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had emphasised the problems inherent in 
                                                 
16
 This declaration enabled Pacific states to engage in peacebuilding without the UN as operational 
leaders. This evaded any veto vote from the Chinese, as the Solomon Islands had formally recognised 
Taiwan’s independence. 
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intervening, including lacking an exit-strategy and being foreigners in a domestic 
conflict. Downer now believed that the unrest had forced Australia into a position of 
nation building for Australia’s own self-interest and that the opportunity for external 
involvement was better than it had been previously (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 287; Wallis, 
2006: 82; McDougall, 2004: 217). Australia’s commitment was followed closely by 
New Zealand, who had held off earlier intervention as they waited for wider Solomon 
Island’s approval. New Zealand’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Phil Goff 
suggested that imposing a solution to the conflict was impossible, and had waited to 
commit until all the parties involved wanted the presence of the intervention force 
(New Zealand Herald, 2000). 
 
RAMSI also contained elements from several Pacific Island states as a means of 
justifying the action as a regional intervention rather than a neo-colonial action (see 
Figure 10). Despite the apparent success, RAMSI was unable to retrieve many of the 
high-powered weapons taken from the police armouries or resolve the deep-rooted 
ethnic problems17 (McDougall, 2004: 219, 221). 
 
Country of Origin Police Personnel Military Personnel 
Australia 196 1,379 
New Zealand 33 240 
Fiji 15 121 
PNG - 83 
Samoa 15 - 
Tonga 10 35 
Kiribati 5 - 
Cook Islands 2 - 
Total 276 1,858 
 
(Figure 10: Initial Military and Police Deployment under RAMSI  
(Fraenkel, 2004: 167)) 
 
                                                 
17
 One mark of RAMSI’s success was the arrest of Harold Keke in 2004, a leader of the few remaining 
armed forces signalling an end to organised violent resistance. 
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The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework has highlighted the consistency of 
RAMSI and shows how they differ tremendously from those involved in the original 
conflict. The conflict parties were, for the most part, disarmed and demobilised during 
the peacebuilding phase, allowing the principle external parties free reign to 
implement their desired changes. This category thus illustrates the character of the 
parties involved in the peacebuilding phase, allowing comparison with the conflicts to 
determine which parties remained consistent through the entire period. 
 
7.4b Governance 
 
During the period of conflict, the Solomon Islands were incapable of operating as a 
national entity. The functions of state were rendered inoperable, causing the economy 
to stagnate and law and order to break down and become subordinate to regional 
gangs (Mortlock, 2006: 116). RAMSI’s intervention during this period allowed the 
government to stabilise its practices and redevelop the state’s economic practices. 
However, expectations of patronage still remained within the wider community. This 
meant that despite substantial efforts to protect and enhance the economy of the 
Solomon Islands, corruption and government level tradition continued to cause 
problems. While there was substantial support for RAMSI to break the cycles of 
violence in the Solomon Island’s, there was far less elite backing for any overhaul of 
governance practices as this would interrupt the tradition of patronage within the 
wider Solomon Island communities (Hameiri, 2007: 431). This combination of a state 
unwilling to change its traditional practices and the need for wider reconstruction 
prevented vital changes from taking place, leading to a situation ripe for violence. 
 
This category reflects the need to study the states ability to perform basic economic 
practices within traditional societies. When compared with the previous governance 
category, this indicates that significant steps were taken to stabilise the economy but 
the problems with elite decision-makers prevented a full overhaul of the governance 
issues from the previous period. 
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7.4c Reconstruction 
 
By 2005 the Solomon Island’s economy had begun to recover and the state was 
finally able to pay its public servants and service its debt, due primarily to foreign aid 
and better management of the state’s finances (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 298). This need 
for aid has created a short-term dependency that has increased the likelihood of the 
Solomon Islands being unable to sustain its recovery in the absence of RAMSI and 
foreign intervention (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 299). This dependency has also meant that 
the private sector has not recovered on its own merits, with some rural regions 
reporting unemployment rates as high as 70% (Romer and Renzaho, 2007: 9). 
Economic reconstruction has been highly encouraged in the most secure areas such as 
Honiara, but this has resulted in the rural services remaining in disarray, reducing 
overall confidence in RAMSI’s capability (Wallis, 2006: 89).  
 
The police service was also remodelled alongside the RAMSI forces, undertaking 
joint patrols and operations. As the foreign intervention force was granted immunity 
to domestic law, they had far reaching power to chase those responsible for earlier 
crimes. However, this power was resented, especially given the restrictions the 
foreign force placed on the RSIPS to avoid comparisons to the period in which the 
MEF had operated.  
 
The framework highlights that the primary areas redeveloped during this period were 
the state economic sector with support for private enterprises within Honiara itself. 
The police service was also mostly unchanged from its earlier position, but was 
overshadowed by the foreign intervention force. This category is important, as it 
shows that in comparison with the earlier conflict some important changes have 
occurred, with the results indicated in the next conflict period. 
 
7.4d Reconciliation 
 
By November 2003 RAMSI had already undertaken significant restoration of law and 
order in the Solomon Islands. More than 3,700 weapons (of which 660 were high 
powered military grade weaponry and hundreds of World War Two era rifles) were 
surrendered and over 700 people were arrested (Kabutaulaka, 2005a: 297; Fraenkel, 
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2004: 170). While disarmament is not specifically a psychologically therapeutic 
activity, surrendering weapons increased the potential for peace acceptance. Rather 
than demand apologies or restitution, disarmament signified that the parties were 
ready to move on. However, judicial processes became overloaded during this period, 
with over 1,300 arrests within the first year. This required a huge influx of capital into 
a judicial system where securing convictions was extremely difficult (Fraenkel, 2004: 
175). Joint community police patrols between RAMSI and the RSIPS encouraged 
trust in this judicial system despite the low conviction rate (Wallis, 2006: 87).  
 
This is a useful part of the framework as it indicates both willingness on behalf of the 
parties to stop fighting and also a reflection of the main focus of RAMSI’s police 
intervention. The reconciliation category allows some study of how the initial conflict 
ended, and how the peacebuilding efforts attempted to repair social relationships and 
bring the conflict parties closer together. The ramifications can be seen in the later 
causes of strife, as any causes relating to aggressive relationships between the parties 
can be directly related to this phase. 
 
7.5 Conflict Event 
 
In April 2006, contending politics in the Solomon Islands came to a head in the 
aftermath of the election of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister, with large numbers of 
Solomon Islanders taking to the streets and devastating the thriving Chinese business 
district (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 420; Hameiri, 2007: 432). Rini had been 
implicated in allegations of corruption alongside outgoing Prime Minister Kemakeza, 
emphasising the public perception that corrupt governance practices would continue. 
The use of behind-doors finance and business community interests perpetuated the 
belief that the ‘rich’ migrant Chinese community was in part responsible for the 
election victory18 (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 421-422; Wallis, 2006: 87). The 
capital’s private sector had already been overloaded and stretched to capacity as was 
indicated by the huge number of unemployed youths that took part in the riots 
(Kabutaulaka, 2005b: 414). RAMSI’s response was hindered, as at the time of the 
riots the bulk of RAMSI’s military and police equipment had returned to Australia, as 
                                                 
18
 Many also resented the Chinese remittances practice and saw it as taking Solomon Island finances 
offshore and not helping the local community. 
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part of the transition from enforced peace to civilian reconstruction had been ongoing 
for 2 years19 (Fraenkel, 2004: 177). After the riots the role of RAMSI came under 
serious scrutiny both by foreign policy analysts and by the Solomon Island’s 
government due to RAMSI’s inability to foresee potential breakdowns in law and 
order with upcoming elections, and its failure to send reinforcements. The violence 
was seriously damaging to RAMSI’s reputation and effectiveness (Wallis, 2006: 88; 
Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 412). 
 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the 2006 riots was the lack of personal 
violence. While the 1998-2003 civil strife had resulted in a number of fatalities and 
vicious assaults, there were no deaths and only a small number of serious injuries 
during the riots (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 422; Wallis, 2006: 88). Violence was 
targeted not at individuals, but rather at the destruction of specific Chinese owned 
business property, which illustrated a significant change in the acceptance of violence 
as a medium of conflict resolution. The riots were a swift, one-off event that disrupted 
the peace process and brought to a head many underlying tensions that still existed 
despite the perceived success of RAMSI’s operations. 
 
7.5a Involvement 
 
The youths and leaders involved in the 2006 riots were its only main participants. Life 
for most Solomon Islanders was difficult during this period and they struggled to 
provide for their families while being asked to reconcile with neighbours who had 
previously been violent and hostile (Wallis, 2006: 91). Any problems that were too 
difficult to resolve were often left for RAMSI to deal with, leading to individual 
dependency and a lack of desire amongst local communities to reconcile their own 
issues. While RAMSI was able to deter any further outbreaks of violence, their role in 
the actual riot was negligible and thus they are not included as a direct participant in 
this period. 
 
                                                 
19
 RAMSI was also hindered by prearranged training exercises that had the bulk of their forces away 
from Guadalcanal on the day of the riots. As a result, they were not able to swiftly respond to the 
violence, a situation that was not well received by the Solomon Islands politicians. 
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Youth dissatisfaction at a lack of opportunities and an inability to be part of the 
process of change undoubtedly led to a rising frustration that manifested in the riots 
(Romer and Renzaho, 2007: 14). The ongoing tension was linked to the involvement 
of youths in the Solomon Islands, and the riots were the result of their growing 
dissatisfaction at marginalisation from the changes that had been dominated by 
RAMSI and Australian officials. The Chinese business class was a convenient target, 
as they were perceived to have benefited unequally from the RAMSI contracts 
(Hameiri, 2007: 432-433).  
 
This category has highlighted the potential for aggression in unemployed youth while 
also showing how RAMSI was both culpable and dealt poorly with the developing 
situation. It is also distinctly different from the earlier conflict, as this time the 
outsider was the Chinese ‘elites’ instead of those from another island. The 
Comparative Peacebuilding Framework has thus highlighted the importance of 
comparing involvement categories, as the parties taking part in the 2006 riots was 
substantially different from those in the earlier conflict, despite many of the 
underlying causes being similar. 
 
7.5b Governance 
 
RAMSI’s emphasis had been placed on the rebuilding of effective institutions of 
government and strengthening good governance practices (Morgan and McLeod, 
2006: 413). They remained ‘hands off’ with the open and democratic general 
elections but there was recognition by RAMSI that without significant change in the 
government’s leadership, civil disorder or trouble was highly probable (Romer and 
Renzaho, 2007: 11). 
 
The 2006 elections were the catalyst for the riots, but the results were fairly typical 
with a similar turnover of Members of Parliament (approximately 60%) to the 2001 
elections (Morgan and McLeod, 2006: 417). However, it was the election of Snyder 
Rini to Prime Minister that was the most contentious issue. Rini had been a politician 
since 1989, he was the Minister of Finance and Treasury in 2000, and served as the 
deputy to the outgoing Prime Minister Kemakeza. There was a strong perception that 
Rini’s leadership would be a continuation of the same style of politics and corruption 
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that had accompanied Kemakeza’s term (Wallis, 2006: 94). Given that Rini’s political 
party did not have the votes to select him as Prime Minister by itself, rumours swiftly 
circulated that Chinese business interests had influenced the internal process of 
selecting the Prime Minister (Romer and Renzaho, 2007: 10). This placed blame 
directly on Rini and local Chinese businessmen, and when the riots broke out, Rini 
was forced to resign soon after in order to keep the wider peace.  
 
This category describes the actions of the national government as being observed by 
many Solomon Islanders with a developed national identity who had become 
disillusioned at the continuation of ongoing corruption20. When compared with earlier 
governance practices, there were few changes to political practices and would seem to 
remain consistent throughout. The use of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework 
here highlights RAMSI’s lack of changes to the political system. 
 
7.5c Structural 
 
The traditional institutions in the Solomon Islands have inadvertently interfered with 
the establishment of modern state apparatus, leading RAMSI to insert personnel at the 
top level (Hameiri, 2007: 412). As the support for RAMSI and the restructuring 
techniques have waned over time, open criticism from Parliament and public critics 
about RAMSI’s operating procedures have restricted their capability (Wallis, 2006: 
90). Furthermore, resentment for RAMSI’s legal immunity during the intervention has 
raised questions about the legality and authenticity of the Solomon Islands 
government and their acceptance of the intervention force (Wallis, 2006: 91). 
Conversely, the RSIPS was unable to curtail the rioting during this conflict, as they 
were outnumbered by the rioters and unwilling to act without RAMSI’s forces to 
assist them.  
 
The Comparative Peacebuilding Framework shows that in comparison to structural 
concerns in the earlier conflict, significant changes have occurred. The problems of 
population dynamics and corruption of the police service were reduced by RAMSI’s 
                                                 
20
 Further sinister governance practices are reflected in the July 2007 swearing in of Julian Moti as 
Attorney General who remains wanted in Australia on paedophilia charges. The instability of the new 
leadership was also shown by the December 2007 no-confidence vote in Sogavare that removed him as 
Prime Minister.  
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securitisation procedures, while the same processes introduced a new set of political 
problems, highlighting the structural differences between the two periods. 
 
7.5d Causes of Strife 
 
The state institutions dealt with dual roles, trying to implement western style 
government and state practices within a traditional society, inevitably generating 
tension (Hameiri, 2007: 417-419). This tension gave way to violence, as expected 
electoral results did not eventuate, furthering a perception that corrupt politics were 
continuing. This was a significant cause as the changes implemented during the 
transition were indirectly responsible for promoting optimism for change. As results 
failed to materialise, it was not difficult for many to take a leap of logic and find a 
target for that anger. The continuing problem of youth dissociation from positive 
change coupled with corruption in the government and the growth in the Chinese 
business district had led to a situation where anger and resentment were triggered into 
physically clashing against a visible external influence.  
 
Use of the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework allows a way to see the causes of 
the 2006 riots in the context of how the earlier conflict was concluded. The first 
conflict was ended in foreign intervention and followed by a lengthy peace process. 
The causes of the riots were accordingly related to aspects that had not changed from 
the earlier resolution, including the traditional political practices.  
 
7.6 Analysis of Success or Failure 
 
The transition period was clearly successful, as the state had exhibited the symptoms 
of a failed state but over time had improved its ability to manage its affairs with 
external support (Hameiri, 2007: 411). Unfortunately, many of RAMSI’s actions can 
be seen as merely providing a ‘band-aid’ to the areas problems, as they simply 
separated the factions without being able or willing to resolve many of the deeper 
issues. Consequently, RAMSI has mainly been successful in building a state identity 
that both Guadalcanalese and Malaitans can be a part of, without satisfying any long-
term reconstruction criteria such as running peaceful election processes (Morgand and 
McLeod, 2006: 414; Wallis, 2006: 83). Given that the long-term goal is to promote 
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good governance and rebuild the Solomon Island’s state institutions and the integrity 
of its government (Hameiri, 2007: 411), its failure to prevent the 2006 riots appears to 
indicate a lack of specific success. However, by propping up the Solomon Islands and 
preventing the state from failing, the peacebuilding phase can be seen as a very 
successful preventative measure (Wallis, 2006: 83).  
 
Using the framework and comparing the earlier conflict to the recent riots, only a 
handful of elements can be seen to be common to both. The most important of these is 
the perception of corruption within the government. While patronage and similar 
practices were dominant in pre-1999 Solomon Islands politics, there was an 
assumption that RAMSI’s intervention would put an end to this form of endemic state 
corruption. As the election results seemed to indicate that financial corruption was 
still rife, public reaction was not unexpected. The most significant differences 
included the reduction in race related conflict, lack of fatalities, and the use of the 
police service as an extension of a conflict participant. This is extremely relevant as 
the securitisation by RAMSI enhanced the wider peace, resulting in violence 
occurring within Honiara, but failing to spread outside of the capital. As the target of 
the antagonism was not a different ethnic group and rather the businesses operated, 
there was a physical manifestation to target instead of individuals to attack. These 
differences clearly show the overall success of the peacebuilding period and reinforce 
the use of a framework for comparative study. 
 
7.7 Framework Analysis 
 
The Solomon Islands peacebuilding effort has been regarded as one of the world’s 
most successful attempts to prevent the reoccurrence of violence. Figure 11 shows the 
most important facets of each category in a simplistic manner and serves as an easy 
way to compare each period. This framework has displayed some of the broad 
decisions and actions made by RAMSI during this period, and highlighted some of the 
key differences between the two periods. As the 2006 conflict was far less violent, 
contained and brief, the peacebuilding period is widely considered a success, and the 
large number of differences indicates that there has been a significant change. Some 
of the differences are clear within the model such as the target and the source of the 
violence, a change that made the conflicts almost completely different in nature, while 
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other differences seem to exacerbate the situation, especially in terms of economic 
dependency. However, a number of similarities are also clearly evident such as the 
ongoing political disruption, corruption and patronage, and a weak national private 
sector. These similarities lie at the heart of both conflicts. While RAMSI has altered 
the breadth and intensity of the violence, concerns over political validity and the 
foreign forces capability to change ingrained practices have been highlighted by the 
respective categories in the model. 
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Chapter Eight: 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
8.1 Results 
 
The research presented here has illustrated an approach to categorical analysis of a 
post-conflict reconstruction effort. Utilising the significant body of literature in the 
wider peace fields to augment the relatively new concepts in peacebuilding, this study 
has turned a vague concept into a firm framework. Rather than dealing with a diverse 
body of theory, the Comparative Peacebuilding Framework demonstrates one 
technique to collate extensive case study information into a form that is suitable for 
comparison. The aim of this research was to create a model that is capable of 
illustrating a new approach to peacebuilding theory that could be adapted for using 
with several individual cases. 
 
The framework was tested by studying three separate cases that had several distinct 
similarities and differences, illuminating both how the framework should be used and 
what it could reveal. The Bougainville conflict throughout the 1990’s focused on the 
implications of resource and territory control. This conflict illustrated that even when 
peacebuilding was considered unsuccessful, with poor reconstruction or outside 
influence, the parties were still able to secure a lasting peace through a small number 
of key decisions. Use of the framework highlighted these decisions without requiring 
an in-depth analysis of the entire conflict, demonstrating how the framework can be 
used as a simple analytical tool. While the Fijian coups had organised political 
peacebuilding activities combined with the restructuring of the police to resist future 
coups, this did not prevent a wider outbreak of violence in 2000. The framework was 
able to show that the majority of influences and change occurred in regards to state 
governance, and that no wider ethnic reconciliation was undertaken. Ultimately all the 
political progress was reversed by the new leaders with surprising ease. Finally, the 
violence in the Solomon Islands had the most cohesive and organised of the 
peacebuilding efforts, with the inclusion of an external intervention force. Use of the 
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framework described a peacebuilding process that was dominating in appearance but 
failed to address the long-standing traditions within the Solomon Islands political 
culture. It also highlighted the sacrosanct nature of democracy as the intervention 
force was unable to interfere with high-level political decisions that have begun to 
erode confidence in RAMSI and that could ultimately lead the Solomon Islands 
government to expel the intervention force before its goals are realised. The three 
cases produced here have had varying degrees of success in their peacebuilding 
periods, both in repairing the functions of state and in reconciling relationships for 
future progress. All of the problems remaining in each case may be too intrinsic and 
emotionally attached to the main party’s that they cannot be resolved within a small 
generational timeframe. However, peacebuilding that can identify the nature of the 
intrinsic problem may be able to redirect tension and coerce at least a temporary 
peace.  
 
When compared against each other, these cases revealed several interesting 
similarities that allow this framework to contribute to the peacebuilding literature. 
While some of these have been repeated many times throughout conflict theories, 
reinforcing this in an in-depth comparative study improves the potential to study these 
causes more precisely. For example, the removal of the same flash-point cause that 
triggered the initial conflict would appear to be common sense, but many of these 
triggers are too intangible to be changed by surface peacebuilding efforts. Conversely, 
in those cases where the parties involved differed between conflict periods, the 
violence was far more subdued than those where the same parties fought, indicating 
that disarmament and demobilisation tactics may be a superior use of peacebuilding 
finances. It is information such as this that reinforces the need for comparative 
research and justifies the development of this framework. 
 
8.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
There are some common themes throughout these case studies. It is the similarities 
and differences between the cases themes that define how successful the comparative 
analysis is. In the summarised results there are a handful of integral points that appear 
relevant for comparison, while some interesting points do not appear, but are 
important in understanding wider conflict processes. 
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The removal of the main conflict ‘flashpoint’ is an important step in preventing the 
same conflict from reoccurring. In the Bougainville conflict, the mine remained 
closed, ensuring wider violence did not erupt, while the Solomon Islands political 
patronage and corruption was less apparent as RAMSI took over much of the state 
sector. Both of the second conflicts in these cases were far more subdued than the 
same period in Fiji. Fijian constitutional problems and political results were repeated 
in a similar fashion in the second conflict, indicating that in all the case studies the 
initial triggers remain extremely valid. While these triggers may be too intangible to 
repair with a short peacebuilding effort, some efforts can still be taken to reduce the 
potential for the same conflict trigger to be repeated, either by long-term measures or 
by simply removing the trigger entirely. 
 
Party consistency has also been revealed as an important factor. In both Bougainville 
and the Solomon Islands the target of the violence changed radically. The state ceased 
to be a primary target in Bougainville, forcing any aggression to target former 
constituents; while in the Solomon Islands the two main ethnic groups found a 
common antagonist in the ‘new’ outsider. As the second conflicts were far more 
contained, both geographically and in intensity, the constituents of each conflict party 
may be important. Taking into account the Fijian violent second coup and the 
similarity of those involved, demonstrated that with the same parties involved in 
multiple conflicts, that there is a higher potential for increased violence and tension. 
By ensuring that the same parties are not involved in a second conflict, the old 
feelings and tensions from previous violence may be diminshed. 
 
The power of political and economic elites is usually seen as an important element in 
the emergence of conflict. However, these case studies have been indecisive in 
determining their importance. While Fiji and the Solomon Islands had differing elites 
as conflict targets, these roles could be fulfilled by a variety of groups. The Fijian 
political elites were not the target of the conflict; rather the minority ethnic group’s 
political victories were triggers, and the nationalist organisations were the aggressor. 
Bougainville’s landowner elites were also less important in the wider conflict, as the 
conflict pertained to public antipathy to PNG and foreign dominance instead of any 
inter-elite conflict. Thus, the cases have been unable to prove any links between the 
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importance of elites and the propagating of conflicts. This is an unexpected result, as 
many conflicts would appear to be battles for control over elite dominance of 
resources. 
 
The capability of the police and military forces are mixed in determining whether 
conflict will reoccur. The Bougainville case study is irrelevant in this regard as the 
police and military was an organ of the PNG state and acted as an aggressor rather 
than as a judicial agent. However, they were very important in the Fiji and Solomon 
Islands conflict. During the Fijian coups, the police changed to become an element of 
the conflict itself, resulting in wider violence than had been present earlier. The 
Solomon Islands police service was also important, as the perceived bias and 
influence of the Malaitans created ill feeling between the Guadalcanalese and the 
police service. This distrust forced RAMSI to restructure the police service and 
perform joint patrols, and when RAMSI was unable to respond to the riots, the police 
were too weak to contain the violence. This shows that trust in the sanctity of judicial 
and law enforcement agencies are important in the absence of external replacements. 
 
Some other elements are also interesting, but cannot be adjusted by peacebuilding 
efforts. For example, the spread or geographical size of the conflict has proven 
important in determining the number of casualties and overall societal disruption. The 
Solomon Island riots were contained within Honiara’s business district; the first Fijian 
coup was contained by the loyalist police forces, and the second period of violence in 
Bougainville was curtailed by combined police actions against the militant gangs. 
While the greater spread of violence is obviously linked to an increase in intensity and 
casualties, being able to state it with descriptive proof provides further rationale to 
study this in an organised framework.  
 
A second element is the poor economic development of states in conflict that results 
in few job opportunities and restricted state capability. This is important, as those 
without any way to earn income and restore a basic lifestyle often react negatively. In 
the Solomon Islands poor economic indicators led many disaffected youths to 
violence, but this was less of a factor in the other two cases. Because of this, the 
economic condition cannot be used for wider analysis in this study, but remains a 
potent aspect of civil violence.  
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The intensity of initial violence is an interesting component of conflict for 
comparison. In two of the case studies, the initial conflict was far more intense than 
the second conflict, but this did not stop the conflict from reoccurring. However, the 
experience of suffering and hardship during extremely violent periods may reduce the 
likelihood of those same parties to resort to extreme measures in the future. This is not 
something a peacebuilder can address during their transition period, as an inflamed 
conflict is both undesirable and comes before the peace process can begin. However, 
this is important to understand, as an experienced peace builder may be able to take 
advantage of this and use post-conflict emotions as a tool to restore relationships and 
rebuild states. 
 
8.3 Criticisms 
 
This framework is largely categorical and descriptive in nature, and has resulted in 
lengthy case studies to describe every facet of the conflict. An approach that utilised 
statistical methods may have been more effective in determining the most probable 
factors that caused a conflict to reoccur. However, this is less appropriate for 
determining the actions of successful peacebuilding periods, as categorising the vast 
number of actions into test-capable statistics is a highly complex task. Projects such as 
Genets empirical analysis of reoccurring civil war have gone to great lengths to find 
key elements that are common to reoccurrences, however these do not study 
individual cases in enough detail to compare the post-conflict reconstruction period 
(Genet, 2007). This produces only a handful of possible influences and does not 
directly assist peacebuilding practitioners further than helping to direct them towards 
the right time to intervene. A repeat of this categorical project is more suitable as a 
Mixed-Method project as suggested in the earlier literature, despite the size and 
problems this study would entail. The wider mathematical approach to locate key 
elements within cases would allow a closer analysis of each case and peacebuilding 
actions could be compared generating a better understanding of why each action was 
taken. 
 
These cases were chosen on the premise of a second conflict emerging from the first. 
However, none of these had a peacebuilding exercise officially recognised and 
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sponsored by the UN, the international agency that traditionally performs these tasks. 
As such, future cases should be taken from a broader geographical area that have had 
UN peacebuilding missions, with the benefit of access to a wide variety of official 
information. However, the list of UN peacebuilding missions remains fairly small and 
many are still ongoing. Consequently, future case selection is problematic. Further 
study will also need to use a variety of cases that include both successful and 
unsuccessful peacebuilding phases. When combined with a statistical approach, 
specific cases with significant divergences could be analysed and the model would be 
less reliant on choosing similar case studies.  
 
This model suits a specific number of cases. For the number selected in this thesis, a 
model appears unnecessary as the size of each is small enough to study without 
categorical analysis, and instead can use basic case material. Conversely, this 
framework may not be appropriate for large numbers of cases as the depth of 
information provided will be too large for comparative analysis, and thus may be 
more suited to statistical analysis. Therefore, studies with a small number of cases 
probably do not require a framework, while those with over fifteen studies may be 
better suited to statistical analysis. By acknowledging this weakness outlining the 
correct direction for future studies, this thesis provides one rationale for continuing 
research into comparative post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
 
8.4 Determination of Framework Success 
 
The success of this research lies with the performance of the Comparative 
Peacebuilding Framework. As the framework has been able to indicate some 
significant similarities and differences between the small numbers of cases studied, 
this has been a success. It has shown that despite logistical difficulties in obtaining 
information on the exact peacebuilding actions, judgements can be made based on the 
results of those actions. However, there have been some problems highlighted with 
this approach showing room for future improvement for this framework and similar 
categorical analysis techniques. For example, the lack of UN sponsorship in the cases 
studied is a limitation, as the United Nations is primarily responsible for 
peacebuilding activities internationally. This role is important for the UN, and 
bypassing their cases in favour of less organised attempts devalues their significance 
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and the organised potential of peacebuilding. Non-UN authorised peacebuilding 
efforts, for instance, may be far less financed or experienced than official UN 
missions. Another problem lies in using the categorical approach rather than a 
statistical overview. While categorical studies are more comprehensive and detailed, 
they are difficult to use when comparing a large number of cases. This problem is 
traditionally met by statistical studies that compare vast arrays of data for statistically 
significant divergences, and can be combined with categorical studies for individual 
case analysis. By only selecting three cases and performing a categorical study, this 
framework has neglected the large number of growing conflict databases. Thus, while 
this framework has proven successful in what it set out to do, the original concept 
requires a more in-depth study to deliver more significant research results. 
 
8.5 Future Literature 
 
In a post-cold war period where civil conflict is the dominant form of state violence, 
peacebuilding theory continues to grow in importance. There have been relatively few 
conflicts with sufficient data to study in recent years so if a broad statistical study is 
undertaken, historic conflicts must be used. However, these older conflicts have 
potentially less information to include for comparative purposes, especially on the 
actions that occur during the peacebuilding period. Thus, future research into the 
peacebuilding field must either use recent examples to ensure sufficient evidence 
exists for a comparative study of the peacebuilding phase, or use general information 
from a large number of examples over a greater time scale to determine 
commonalities. In either case, this research will involve far more in-depth study over 
a longer period of time than the research produced here. 
 
There is also scope for research to be directed into more highly theoretical fields. A 
common theory often mentioned is that of applying western democracy and economic 
practices to post-conflict states as a means of determining their level of 
redevelopment. This is a complex field that has many critics and sponsors, and could 
change the entire way post-conflict governance and economic development is treated. 
The predisposition towards western style democracy and free market economics 
emerged from centuries of western history and may not be applicable for the 
relatively recent independence of many Pacific Island states. The clash of tradition 
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versus western practices entices a long debate on these theories and will be addressed 
in future peacebuilding literature.  
 
The case studies reviewed in this research have also pointed to the related field of 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The demobilisation of 
parties in the conflict was resonant in all three cases chosen in this research. 
Disarming and restraining the main offenders within a conflict can directly reduce the 
potential for heightened violence in any reoccurrence as grudges and weapons remain 
potent. This field has been developed substantially in recent years as a peacekeeping 
measure, but should be more closely attached to other, less tangible theories. In 
practice, disarmament and demobilisation is a difficult process to undertake, but is a 
minimum to guarantee security in the conflict zone. Reintegration is a very similar 
concept to reconciliation and it is often treated as a separate field to DDR. However, 
reintegrating individual members of violent parties is complicated but allows those 
individuals to rejoin the wider society. Thus, based on the findings of this research, 
DDR is a significant field for future peacebuilding literature and that will be 
significantly developed alongside other peacebuilding theories in the future.  
 
8.6 Concluding Thoughts 
 
Comparative peacebuilding research is a confident step towards analysing post-
conflict reconstruction. There is plenty of room for development in associated 
theoretical fields and the relatively small number of specialist theorists who research 
this topic provides plenty of opportunity for new approaches. The Comparative 
Peacebuilding Framework presented within this research is one step towards filling 
the conceptual void in this field.  
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